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FOREWORD
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) has maintained close and positive professional ties with our
colleagues at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies
(ACSS) in Washington, DC, since ACSS’s founding
in 1999. The Africa Center is the preeminent U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) institution for strategic
security studies, research, and outreach in Africa. I am
pleased that SSI and ACSS are once more able to collaborate in the publication of this monograph, entitled
Hidden Dragon, Crouching Lion: How China’s Advance in
Africa is Underestimated and Africa’s Potential Underappreciated. Its author, David E. Brown, is currently the
Senior Diplomatic Advisor at ACSS. He brings unique
perspectives to the important foreign policy issue of
China’s rapid commercial and political advance in Africa, having served eight times in China and Africa as
a Foreign Service Officer at U.S. Embassies, U.S. Consulates, and the American Institute in Taiwan.
This monograph is part of our Advancing Strategic
Thought Series precisely because its topic is so important. As Mr. Brown stresses, the explosive growth of
China’s economic interests in Africa is arguably the
most important trend in the continent’s foreign relations since the end of the Cold War. China-Africa
trade passed the $1 billion mark in 1990, jumped to
$10 billion in 2000, and accelerated again, increasing
15-fold in a little over a decade to $150 billion in 2011.
China’s rapidly expanding ties with Africa catapulted
China past the United States in 2010 as Africa’s top
trading partner. Mr. Brown predicts that by 2020,
China’s projected expansion of trade, investment, and
development assistance is likely to secure economic
and political influence for Beijing in Africa that at least
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rivals, if not surpasses, that enjoyed by Europe and
the United States over the last 150 years.
Moreover, as the monograph emphasizes, China’s
quest to build a strategic partnership with Africa must
also be seen in the broader context of the central strategic objective of Beijing’s foreign policy: promoting the
peaceful rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
as a global superpower. What China is now consolidating in Africa is just one part of a broader network
of global alliances that support not only Beijing’s putative leadership in the developing world, but its emerging role as a global power rivaling the United States.
A cornerstone of China’s strategy is also the recognition that its national security ultimately depends on
a strong, internationally competitive economy. With
this in mind, China increasingly turns to Africa not
only for resources to fuel its development, but also for
markets to sustain its growing economy and ultimately support its longer-term aspirations to surpass the
United States as the world’s preeminent power.
An important but secondary theme of this monograph is that Africa has become an attractive trading
partner for China not only for its natural resources,
but as a growing market. Africa’s rapid growth since
2000 has occurred not just because of higher commodity prices, but, more importantly, because of other factors, including improved political governance, macroeconomic stability, microeconomic reforms, increased
globalization, urbanization, an expanding labor force,
and a rising middle class. Mr. Brown argues that
China has been at least 10 years ahead of American
firms in strategic perceptions and thinking about Africa’s economic promise. While many in the West remain Afro-pessimists, he says, the Chinese have been
guarded Afro-optimists or, perhaps more accurately,
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Afro-realists who recognize both the continent’s great
promise and significant risk.
SSI is pleased to offer this monograph in fulfillment of its mission to assist U.S. Army and DoD senior leaders and strategic thinkers in understanding
the key issues of the day.
		
			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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INTRODUCTION
The first part of the title of this monograph is arguably a misnomer. How can China—the Dragon—be
hidden, if its presence in Africa is so obvious to Africans? Africans see evidence of the new China everywhere, from Chinese traders who have appeared
in their markets, to Chinese construction or mining
firms, and to even the Chinese consumer products
found everywhere. Yet, for most Americans, China
in Africa is a hidden dragon. They remain unaware
that a rising China—the greatest partner and rival of
the United States in the 21st century—has already arrived in a big way on a continent that is the ancestral
home of so many Americans as well as the cradle of all
mankind. Americans also remain stuck in old images
of Africa: famine, poverty, and desperation, instead
of the continent’s new reality of progress, prosperity,
and hope.
Two members of the Africa Center for Strategic
Studies in Washington, DC, recently exchanged emails about China, Africa, and the West. The first,
based in the Center’s regional office in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, recounted news that Chinese President Hu
Jintao would visit the Ethiopian capital in January
2012 to inaugurate a new $200 million headquarters
of the African Union paid for by Beijing—China’s
greatest ever gift to Africa and a soft power tour de
force. The second colleague’s response to this e-mail
was brief, but wise: “China rises . . . while the West
sleeps.” China is indeed rising, and the extraordinary
increase over the last 20 years in the breadth, depth,
and complexity of its economic interests and presence
in Africa mirrors its rise in other parts of the world.
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This monograph is divided into four parts: Part 1
describes how China is leading other developing
countries—including the other three “BRIC” countries
(Brazil, Russia, and India)—in expanding aid, trade,
and investment with Africa, defined here as North
and Sub-Saharan Africa. Part 2 answers five major
questions regarding the China-Africa economic relationship: Why China chose to expand its economic ties
to Africa; why it has been so successful in expanding
rapidly; whether new trade credits and development
loans are creating a new African debt burden; whether
African industrialization will be aided or hindered by
China; and what the impact of new, nonstate Chinese
actors (companies and individuals) will be on Africa.
Part 3 addresses the strategic importance to China of
its oil, minerals, and agriculture trade with and investments in Africa, while Part 4 discusses U.S. responses
to China’s advance into Africa.

x

HIDDEN DRAGON, CROUCHING LION:
HOW CHINA’S ADVANCE IN AFRICA
IS UNDERESTIMATED AND AFRICA’S
POTENTIAL UNDERAPPRECIATED
SUMMARY
The explosive growth of China’s economic interests in Africa is arguably the most important trend in
the continent’s foreign relations arena since the end
of the Cold War. China-Africa trade passed the $1 billion mark in 1990, jumped to $10 billion in 2000, and
accelerated again, increasing 15-fold in a little over a
decade to $150 billion in 2011. China’s rapidly expanding ties with Africa catapulted China past the United
States in 2010 as Africa’s top trading partner. China’s
projected expansion of trade, investment, and development assistance is likely by 2020 to secure economic
and political influence for Beijing in Africa that at least
rivals, if not surpasses, that enjoyed by Europe and
the United States over the last 150 years.
China’s advance in Africa is 10 years ahead of
similar moves by the other BRIC (Brazil, Russia, and
India) emerging market leaders. Other developing
countries in the Middle East and Asia are also entering
African markets. With the important exception of the
petroleum sector, China already has largely displaced
traditional colonial powers and the United States as
the predominant economic power in Africa. This displacement also mirrors Beijing’s ongoing rapid expansion in Latin America and exemplifies China’s rise in
the early-21st century as a second great power rivaling the United States.
China’s four main interests in Africa are: securing
natural resources, including petroleum and strategic
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minerals; tapping an emerging market that has great
long-term potential and is underestimated by the
West; securing political support from African nations
in the United Nations (UN); and ensuring Taiwan’s
diplomatic isolation. The first two economic interests
now dominate the latter two political interests—a role
reversal from the Maoist and immediate post-Maoist
periods ending in 1978—and reflect Beijing’s recognition that national security ultimately comes from economic strength.
Africa has become an attractive trading partner
for China, not only for its natural resources, but as a
growing market. Africa’s rapid growth since 2000—
averaging 4.5 percent annually—has been due in part
to a commodities “super cycle,”1 but more importantly to other factors, including improved political
governance, macroeconomic stability, microeconomic
reforms, increased globalization, urbanization, an expanding labor force, and a rising middle class.
The key milestones influencing the recent history of
China’s relations with Africa are: 1978, when Beijing’s
“reform and opening” policies started; 1993, when
China became an oil-importing country; 1995, when
China’s State Council ordered that aid, trade credits,
and development finance to Africa be tied to Chinese
commercial interests; 2000, when China started its
triennial Heads of State summitry with Africa; and
2001, when China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and also launched its “going-out” policy
to support the development of Chinese multinational
firms, including those in Africa.
China’s rapid and successful expansion in Africa
is due to a multiplicity of factors, including economic
diplomacy that is clearly superior to that of the United
States, which cut back on support for U.S. business in
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Africa just as China surged ahead. Beijing skillfully
supports its economic diplomacy in Africa through
triennial heads of state summits; sustained high-level bilateral visits; a universal diplomatic presence in
Africa (except for four small countries where Taipei
makes its last stand)2; symbolic diplomacy exemplified
by the new Chinese-built African Union headquarters
opened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2012;
bilateral trade, investment, and tax agreements; and
vastly expanded “soft power” diplomacy—cultural
centers, a volunteer corps, and international visitor
programs—lifted from the U.S. diplomatic playbook.
Another factor in China’s success has been its aggressive, integrated, and mercantilist policies for official
aid, preferential trade credits, and development finance—all of which draw upon China’s own development experience and an Asian-style, state-led growth
model.
China, aided by its mercantilist policy of undervaluing its currency, has been successful in the Africa
market because of the lower cost of its goods and services, but is also moving up the value-added chain for
goods and becoming more competitive in services,
especially engineering and construction. China has
hurt African industrialization in textiles, negating the
positive effects of the Africa Growth and Opportunity
Act (AGAO) after the phaseout of the WTO Multifiber Agreement in 2005. At the same time, China has
aided nontextile industrialization by: 1) restructuring
its industry to “sunset” to Africa some of its low-tech,
labor-intensive, and/or environmentally problematic
industries such as shoes and leather; 2) adding backward and forward integration to its mining investments, and upstream goods used in construction; and,
3) supporting infrastructure improvements, including
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those in new Special Economic Zones (SEZs) now under construction.
Western donors are concerned that China’s “no
strings attached” approach to development risks undoing decades of Western efforts to promote good
governance, revenue transparency, and responsible
natural resource development in Africa; corrupts
African elites; unfairly promotes China’s interests at
the expense of other non-African nations by violating
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) norms for aid and trade credits; freerides on Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt
relief; and risks new unsustainable debts for African
nations. China denies these charges, arguing that the
commodity offtake agreements that are part of some
new loans mitigate risk for China and ensure that
African countries use resource revenues in ways that
invest in development instead of being squandered by
elites. Beijing is filling an important gap in Western
aid—and doing well commercially—by focusing on
improving Africa’s infrastructure.
While China’s engagement with Africa has up to
now been primarily led by the Chinese governmentand state-owned enterprises, nonstate actors, including privatized Chinese corporations and citizens, are
increasingly important. These nonstate actors are
making a contribution to the diversity and depth of
Chinese trade and investment with Africa, but are also
aggravating a host of problems, including rampant
corruption, the flouting of labor and environmental
laws, and the sale of counterfeit goods. Large-scale
immigration by Chinese to Africa—by some estimates,
totaling over 1 million people—is creating tensions,
particularly with African retail traders. Some African
politicians and the continent’s civil society are starting
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to debate the costs and benefits of China’s growing
economic ties with the continent.
China, more than the United States, needs Africa
as a source of oil to fuel its rapid industrialization
and diversify supplies away from the volatile Middle
East. One-third of China’s oil imports come from the
continent, versus 18-19 percent for the United States.
China’s “oil diplomacy” has been most successful in
Angola (due to corruption and financing deals linked
to infrastructure needs) and in other African countries
with smaller fields—ignored as marginal or politically
sensitive by major Western companies. China’s use of
rare-earth metals to threaten Japan over a territorial issue and the United States over Taiwan arms sales suggests that the United States should carefully monitor
China’s mining investments in strategic defense-critical minerals in southern Africa. The U.S. Department
of Defense (DoD) may ultimately choose to replenish
stockpiles sold off after the end of the Cold War. Food
security is a major issue for China, but Africa is not
seen as an important source of future food imports.
While Africa has 60 percent of the world’s total uncultivated arable land, the Chinese have not been largescale buyers or lessees of African land, in part because
Beijing fears being accused of a land grab.
The official U.S. rhetoric is that China’s rise in Africa should not be seen as a zero-sum game with the
West, but areas for real U.S.-China cooperation to help
Africa will remain elusive. The fundamental problem
is China’s domestic politics, in which many actors
benefit from China’s current modus operandi in Africa
and, in any event, are hyper-mistrustful of the United
States. The United States could help itself, however,
by improving its economic diplomacy and statecraft,
including, initiating a presidential summit with Afri-
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can heads of state; better funding of U.S. Government
agencies providing trade advocacy, export credits,
and investment insurance; and reforming the U.S.
Foreign Commercial Service and how U.S. diplomats
are trained and rewarded for commercial advocacy.
The United States should also adequately fund its
own soft power efforts, focusing on public diplomacy.
U.S. policymakers should also continue to seek areas
where cooperation with China regarding Africa may
be possible. In light of African-led efforts in the UN,
one area worth exploring is cooperation with Beijing
to improve maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea
by training and equipping West and Central African
navies and coast guards.
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PART I:
CHINA LEADS THE DEVELOPING WORLD
IN FOSTERING ECONOMIC TIES TO AFRICA
THE HIDDEN DRAGON: CHINA’S MAIN
INTERESTS IN AFRICA AND PLACE
IN THE WORLD
The People’s Republic of China (PRC), founded in
1949, started providing aid to African nations in the
early 1950s, first to Egypt. China’s supreme leader,
Mao Zedong, aided Africa’s newly independent nations in the late 1950s and early 1960s, in competition with Moscow and Washington. After a period
of retrenchment in the 1970s, China’s involvement in
Africa, both diplomatic and commercial, came alive
again in the 1980s as an international extension of
Deng Xiaoping’s policies of “reform and opening,”
which were initiated in 1978. China-Africa economic
ties gained further momentum in the early 1990s, due
most importantly to China’s search for natural resources. Today, 20 years later, China has the same four
core interests in Africa, albeit with a shift in priorities:
1. Securing Natural Resources: China’s number one
interest in Africa is to increase access to energy, minerals, and raw materials to fuel China’s rapid industrialization and emerging consumer society. China’s
National Oil Companies (NOCs) are developing oil
fields in Africa, and hope one day to compete as technological equals with Western companies. Chinese
firms are already working hyperactively in African
mines, from Guinea’s bauxite to Niger’s uranium to
Zambia’s copper.3
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2. Tapping an Emerging Market: For China, Africa is
a growing, one billion-person market, with increasing
disposable income and an expanding middle class.
Africa’s collective gross domestic product (GDP) will
grow by $1 trillion by 2020, taking it to a total of $2.6
trillion.4 Investment in Africa can also potentially facilitate Beijing’s efforts to restructure China’s own
economy away from low-cost, labor-intensive, and/
or heavily polluting industries.
3. United Nation Votes: African countries account
for more than one-quarter of UN member-states and
votes. By cultivating African nations, China seeks to
win their support in international forums and secure
its status as a rising power. For example, when the
neuralgic issue of Tibet became an issue in 2008 in
the UN Human Rights Council, China leaned on African nations to remain silent or even make supportive
statements.5
4. Isolating Taiwan: The PRC seeks to end Taipei’s
official diplomatic presence in Africa and replace it
with recognition of Beijing. Some observers believe
that since Taiwan’s election in 2008 of President Ma
Yingjiu (who was re-elected in January 2012), there
has been an informal truce between Beijing and Taipei
concerning competition for diplomatic recognition.6
Others argue, however, that the countries worldwide
that still recognize Taipei are so few in number (23),
and that the contest is essentially over.
While China’s interests in Africa until the end of
the Mao era in 1976 were mainly political, they are
now predominantly economic, with 1) and 2) replacing the current 3) and 4) as China’s top priorities.
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AFRICA: AIDING CHINA’S PEACEFUL
RISE AS A SUPERPOWER
China’s quest to build a strategic partnership with
Africa must also be seen in the broader context of the
central strategic objective of Beijing’s foreign policy:
promoting the PRC’s peaceful rise as a global superpower.7 What China is now consolidating in Africa is
just one part of a broader network of global alliances
that support not only Beijing’s putative leadership in
the developing world, but also its emerging role as
a global power rivaling the United States. A cornerstone of China’s strategy is also the recognition that
its national security ultimately depends on a strong,
internationally competitive economy. With this in
mind, China increasingly turns to Africa not only for
resources to fuel its development, but also for markets
to sustain its growing economy and ultimately support its longer-term aspirations to surpass the United
States as the world’s preeminent power. Many of the
trends described in this monograph are also clearly
visible in Latin America, a traditional zone of influence of the United States and a relatively new region
for China.
The tactics that China is using in Africa to realize
its strategic ambitions include: offering powerful economic incentives in the form of vastly expanded trade,
investment, and development assistance; expanded
soft power diplomatic instruments; and peacekeeping and military cooperation (currently limited, but
expanding, e.g., through Chinese offers to support the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the
December 2011 talks with the Seychelles to establish
a resupply facility, ostensibly to fight piracy). Beijing
also tries to distinguish its relations with Africa from
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those of Western powers by framing relations in terms
of Third World solidarity, of its historical ties to Africa starting under Mao, and of calls for expanded ties
based on “mutual respect,” “noninterference in internal affairs,” and “win-win” outcomes.8
Some observers say that Beijing’s moves have been
so rapid, momentous, and successful that they have already put China on par with long-established Western
powers regarding Africa. China-Africa trade passed
the $1 billion level in 1980, jumped to $10 billion in
2000,9 and again increased 15-fold in a little more than
a decade to $150 billion in 2011. China’s projected rapid expansion of trade, investment, and development
assistance is likely in the second decade of the 21st
century to succeed in securing economic and political
ties to African nations that at least rival, if not surpass,
the relations and influence that European nations and
the United States have enjoyed in Africa over the last
150 years.10
OTHER BRICS AND THE DEVELOPING
WORLD ALSO INTERESTED IN AFRICA
While China’s increased presence in Africa is the
single most important foreign policy development
for the continent since the end of the Cold War, it is
also an important component of two broader megatrends in Africa in the new millennium. It is not possible to compare China’s expanding presence in Africa
with that of the West without also appreciating these
broader trends:
1. Increased involvement in Africa by BRICs other
than China, i.e., the emerging powers of Brazil, India, and Russia. The BRICs’ combined foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Africa has already surpassed the
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U.S. total for the continent. Growing interest in African resource investments by other BRICs has granted
African commodity exporters a stronger hand in bargaining with the Chinese. In May 2011, India’s Prime
Minister announced $5 billion in credits for African
governments over the next 3 years—a move widely
seen as an attempt by New Delhi to present itself as a
rival partner to China in Africa.11
2. Expansion in Africa’s South-South trade with
the developing world is eclipsing traditional NorthSouth trade with the European Union (EU), the United
States, and Japan. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) reports that for Sub-Saharan Africa (and for
North Africa as well), there has been a significant and
rapid reorientation of exports toward China, India,
and other developing countries over the past decade.
More than half of the region’s trade (both exports and
imports) is now with nontraditional partners, and
investment flows are moving along a similar course.
Between 1990 and 2010, the share of Sub-Saharan Africa’s exports to advanced economies declined from
78 percent to 52 percent, and the share of Sub-Saharan
Africa’s imports from those countries declined from
73 percent to 43 percent. Most of this reorientation has
occurred during the past 10 years. By 2010, the share of
Sub-Saharan Africa trade with China, India, and Brazil reached approximately 17 percent, 6 percent, and 3
percent, respectively, rising from negligible shares in
1990. Very importantly, this reorientation has largely
occurred through trade creation rather than trade diversion, as engagement with traditional Western partners has continued to grow in recent years, though at a
much slower pace than that with new partners.12 This
trend was accelerated by the global financial crisis
starting in 2008, which hit developed countries harder
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than emerging economies. As World Bank President
Robert Zoellick said in September 2010: “China’s
South-South partnership with Africa in trade, investment, and exchange of know-how can become an important source of growth in the post-crisis era.”13
Africa’s key South-South partners other than China are:
•	India. This country is a distant second behind
China in terms of its expanding engagement on
the continent, but is striving to catch up. This
new Sino-Indo scramble for Africa also reflects
a broader, more intense global competition
between these two emerging Asian powers.
China’s trade with Africa in 2010 totaled $126.9
billion, or two-and-a-half times India’s $51 billion. At the same time, India’s trade with Africa
in 2010 had increased more than 50-fold (from
$967 million in 1990),14 and is expected to rise
to $70 billion by 2015.15 China has almost twice
as many embassies in Africa as India, and its
investment, loans, and aid flows to Africa are
much higher.16 Recognizing China’s lead in Africa, India has stepped up its efforts to gain an
economic foothold on the continent. New Delhi
sponsored the second India-Africa Summit in
Addis Ababa in May 2011. At least in its early
stages, the competition between Beijing and
New Delhi focuses most importantly on Africa’s
natural resources. India’s state Oil and Natural
Gas Corporation (ONGC) signed an agreement
for joint exploration and refining projects with
Angola, which is seen as a precursor to future
rounds of licensing in which ONGC hopes to
win oil blocks. Toward this end, India has al-
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ready offered to invest billions in building and
refurbishing refineries in Angola. Beijing, however, has a huge head start. China has already
granted Luanda an estimated $10 billion in
loans, compared to only $70 million in Indian
loans, and has a larger physical presence in Angola—with than 40,000 workers compared to
India’s 1,500.17
•	Brazil. Although well behind China and India,
Brazil has made its presence felt throughout
much of Africa, and not just in Portuguesespeaking countries. The sharply upwardgrowth trajectory of Brazil’s trade with Africa
has been similar to that of China and India, with
the trade of $3.1 billion in 2000 leaping to $27.6
billion in 2011.18 From 2003 to 2010, Brazilian
President Lula da Silva made 11 trips to 25 African nations and doubled the number of Brazilian embassies in Africa.19 Current Brazilian
President Dilma Rousseff announced in April
2012 the plan of her government to establish a
special fund for Africa to finance development
projects together with the African Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank. During the
same month, the private Brazilian bank, BTG
Pactual, announced the launch of a $1 billion
fund for investment in Africa.20
•	Russia. Meanwhile, Russia is attempting a
comeback in Africa. It had retreated from the
continent after the breakup of the Soviet Union,
closing nine embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa
in 1992. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
traveled in 2009 to Egypt, Nigeria, Angola,
and Namibia to shore up Russian energy, mining, and telecommunication deals.21 However,
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Russia’s trade with Africa was a distant fourth
behind China, India, and Brazil, reaching $3.5
billion in 2009.22 Russia organized a meeting in
December 2011 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, with
250 African businessmen along with Russian
representatives of Gasprombank, Lukoil, and
the Russian Railroad Company interested in
gas and oil exploration and railroad development.23
•	Non-BRICS Developing Countries. There are
also growing trade and investment flows into
Africa from the Middle East and elsewhere in
Asia. Turkey stepped up its engagement in
Africa beginning in 2005, and is an important
player in North Africa and the Horn of Africa.
Iran has focused its attention on northeastern
Africa, but is expanding its relations throughout the continent in part as an effort to escape
political and economic isolation. Government
ministers from 35 African countries attended
the third biennial Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation Ministerial Conference in 2010.24
Other emerging countries that are either reengaging in Africa or arriving for the first time
include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and
Vietnam.25 Reflecting this shift, Asia’s share of
African trade doubled from 1990 through 2008
to 28 percent, while Western Europe’s portion
shrank from 51 percent to 28 percent.26
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TEN YEARS OF SUCCESSFUL AFRICA-CHINA
TRADE: THE DRAGON FLIES MORE SWIFTLY
THAN THE EAGLE
If a June 2010 report by the McKinsey Global Institute is an accurate reflection of renewed U.S. business interest in Africa, then China has been at least 10
years ahead of American firms in strategic perceptions
and thinking about Africa’s economic promise. While
many in the West remain Afro-pessimists, the Chinese
have been guarded Afro-optimists or, perhaps more
accurately, Afro-realists who recognize both the continent’s great promise and significant risk.
China’s confidence in Africa is paying dividends.
While Chinese trade (exports and imports) with the
world rose eightfold from 2000 to 2010, it rose more
than 11-fold with Africa during this same period27
(and 15-fold from 2000 to 2011).28 China, Africa’s largest trading partner, accounted for 10.4 percent of the
continent’s total trade in 2010 (up from about 4 percent in 2000), while Africa accounted for about 4 percent of China’s global trade—up from about 2 percent
in 2000.29 By comparison, the United States, which was
dethroned by China as Africa’s top trading partner
in 2010, had $113 billion in trade in Africa that year,
a 3-fold increase from the $39 billion in trade with
Africa in 2000.30
China’s top trade partners in Africa in 2010 (see
Figure 1) were mainly countries indicated with an
asterisk in Figure 1, from which it purchases oil and
minerals (in $ billions)31:
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1. South Africa ($25.7)*
2. Angola ($24.8)*
3. Nigeria ($7.8)*
4. Egypt ($7.0)
5. Libya ($6.6)*
6. Algeria ($5.2)*
7. Congo ($3.5)*
8. Morocco ($2.9)
9. Zambia ($2.9)*
10. Ghana ($2.1)

11. Kenya ($1.8)
12. Tanzania ($1.7)
13. Ethiopia ($1.5)
14. Mauritania ($1.3)*
15. Gabon ($1.2)*
16. Tunisia ($1.1)
17. Equatorial Guinea ($1.1)*
18. Cameroon ($1.0)*
19. Chad ($0.8)*
20. Botswana ($.04)*

*Indicates country from which China purchased oil and minerals.

Figure 1. China’s Top Trade Partners
in Africa in 2010 (in $ billions).
China’s strong exports to Africa also reflect its increased global competitiveness in a broader range of
products. In 2000, China’s exports to Africa consisted
largely of textiles and clothing (28 percent), machinery
and transportation equipment (27 percent), and other
manufactured goods (26 percent). By 2009, however,
Chinese exports to Africa had shifted to high-end
capital goods, especially communications equipment
(20 percent), road-transport vehicles (19 percent), and
electronic machinery (18 percent). Put differently,
electro-mechanical products such as machinery, automobiles, and electronics accounted for almost 60 percent of China’s exports to Africa—a dramatic increase
since 2000.
By contrast, 90 percent of Africa’s exports to China
in 2010 were oil, minerals, base metals, stone products,
and raw logs.32 About 80 percent of Africa’s exports to
China come from only five oil- and mineral-exporting
16

nations. Primary products such as cotton and phosphate were formerly the main products exported by
Africa to China. In recent years, however, Africa’s
finished industrial products, such as steel and copper
materials, chemical fertilizers, and electronic products, have started to enter the Chinese market. Meanwhile, Africa’s exports of farm produce to China have
also increased rapidly, albeit from a low base.33 (See
the section on agriculture below.)
Similar to unilateral trade preferences granted by
the United States and the EU to Africa, China gives
zero-tariff preferences to certain goods exported to
China from selected African countries. By July 2010,
the number of commodities entitled to the preferential policy increased to more than 4,700 tariff lines,34
and in the future will include up to 95 percent of the
commodities listed in China’s customs database. Africa’s exports of commodities entitled to preferences
have increased rapidly, but still represent only a small
fraction of its total imports: in 2009, China imported
only $4.5 billion of such products from Africa, including farm produce, leather, stone materials, textiles and
garments, machinery parts, base metals, and wood
products.35
CHINA’S FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN AFRICA—LARGE, BUT ESTIMATES DIFFER
Chinese FDI in Africa quadrupled between 2005
and 2009, reaching a cumulative stock of $9.3 billion,
according to the PRC Minister of Commerce figures.
Renaissance Capital predicts this could soar to $40 billion by 2015 (based on a conservative estimate of $5
billion in annual Chinese FDI).36 China’s investments
in Africa at the end of 2009 were increasingly diversi-
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fied, falling in the following sectors: mining/industry
(29.2 percent); manufacturing (22.0 percent); construction (15.8 percent); finance (13.9 percent); business
services (5.4 percent); wholesale/retail trade (4.0 percent); scientific research, technical services, and geological prospecting (3.2 percent); farming, forestry,
fishing, and animal husbandry (3.1 percent); and others (3.4 percent).37 The IMF estimated in October 2011
that China accounted for 16 percent of FDI flows to
Sub-Saharan Africa, up exponentially from less than 1
percent as recently as 2003.38
Chinese official figures for FDI in Africa for the period 2007-10 show an average increase of about $1.5
billion per year if one discounts the exceptional year
of 2008, when Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China (ICBC) purchased 20 percent of South Africa’s
Standard Bank for $5.5 billion. In the year 2010, FDI
was reported to be $2.1 billion.39 The Bank of China
reported that China’s cumulative FDI in Africa was
over $10 billion by the end of 2010, about 20 times that
in 2003. This being said, there is considerable confusion surrounding this figure and China’s definition
of direct investment. Some official Chinese figures
for investment totals in Africa likely understate the
real amount. Even PRC sources cannot agree on the
amount of China’s FDI that has gone into Africa. For
example, the official Xinhua News Agency reported
that, by the end of 2010, China had invested about $40
billion in more than 2,000 enterprises in 50 African
countries—a figure roughly 400 percent at variance
with that of the Bank of China.
While the correct total FDI figure is probably closer
to $40 billion than to $10 billion, Western countries collectively have invested much more in Africa, primarily because they started earlier. By the end of 2008, for
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example, the United States had invested a cumulative
total of $37 billion in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is possible
that today China is investing more in Africa than any
other single country. The primary recipients of Chinese FDI in Africa have been South Africa, Nigeria,
Zambia, Sudan, Algeria, and Egypt—all major oil or
mineral exporters except Egypt.40 (The IMF also lists
Niger, the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC],
and Ethiopia as major recipients of Chinese FDI; the
first two are major mineral exporters.41) Data from the
Heritage Foundation suggest that China was responsible for nearly all FDI into the DRC over the period
2005 to 2009, nearly 50 percent into Nigeria, and 20
percent into South Africa.42 Part of the reason for the
wide discrepancies in FDI statistics is that Chinese investments are often channeled through off-shore entities registered in places such as Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, and others.43 Hong Kong FDI into Africa
was estimated at $5.3 billion in 2008, which helps explain part of the discrepancy.
China’s strategic investments in South Africa’s
financial sector merit particular mention. First, Chinese banks in South Africa are serving their Chinese
customers, for whom South Africa has grown into a
regional hub where Chinese investors can venture
further into the continent.44 South Africa accounts for
fully one-quarter of Chinese FDI in Africa. Second,
Chinese banks are taking equity stakes in South African banks in part to gain market intelligence and business in other African countries. For example, ICBC’s
investment will allow it access to Standard Bank’s
activities in more than 17 countries. A substantial increase in financing for African infrastructure projects
was expected as a result of this investment. This has
become evident as an increasing number of joint proj-
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ects between ICBC and Standard Bank are announced,
recently including financing of $825 million for a coalfired power station in Botswana.45 The China Development Bank also paid $3 billion for a 3.1 percent stake
in Barclays, which has a strong presence in Africa.46
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PART II:
MAJOR QUESTIONS IN THE
CHINA-AFRICA ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP
As noted above, the rapid expansion of China’s
economic interests in Africa is arguably the most important trend in the continent’s foreign relations arena
since the end of the Cold War. To illuminate this trend,
this section addresses several key questions about the
nature of the China-Africa economic relationship:
1. Why did China choose to expand its economic
ties to Africa?
2. Why has China been so successful in expanding
these ties?
3. Are China’s trade credits and development loans
creating a new debt burden for Africa?
4. Will Africa be able to industrialize in part because of, or despite, China?
5. What are the impacts on new nonstate Chinese
actors on Africa?
WHY DID CHINA CHOOSE TO EXPAND ITS
ECONOMIC TIES TO AFRICA?
The first major question addressed is: “Why did
China choose to expand its economic ties to Africa? “
Broadly speaking, there are two reasons:
1. The “pull’ of Africa as an increasingly attractive trade and investment destination, initially as an
indispensable supplier of natural resources, but increasingly as an attractive export market and investment target; and,
2. The “push” of domestic factors within China itself, including the burgeoning demand for inputs to
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feed rapidly rising industrial production, and China’s 2001 accession to the WTO. Along with Beijing’s
mercantilist economic policies, these factors laid the
groundwork for China’s huge trade surpluses, emerging multinationals, and massive capital reserves.
The Pull of Africa: Turning a Corner toward
Sustainable Growth.
Not Just Riding the Latest Commodities Boom. As to
Africa’s “pull” or attractiveness to China, let us first
admit that the beauty of Africa as a trade and investment partner lies in the eye of the beholder. Optimists
rightly see the continent as the last emerging market
frontier—a risky, but extraordinary, opportunity.
They recognize that Africa will continue to take one
step backward, but then two forward. These optimists
recognize that long gone is the continent’s dystopian,
gloom-and-doom, “Out of Africa” era of the 1990s
during which foreign investors fled.47
The Chinese government recognized earlier than
others that Africa had made a fundamental shift. By
the late 1990s, Beijing officials began to believe that
the macroeconomic situation in Africa was taking a
favorable turn: the increasing momentum of Africa’s
economic reform programs was resulting in greater
opportunities for Chinese commerce.48 With 20/20
hindsight, China’s early conversion to a believer may
have also reflected lessons learned from the success of
Beijing’s own reform and opening policies, thus providing the Chinese with confidence that Africa’s own
efforts at economic reform would eventually pay off.
There are still naysayers about Africa’s future,
of course, but they are fewer than in the past. These
naysayers dismiss Africa’s recent economic success as
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primarily the result of an extended supercycle of high
commodity prices, and predict a regression to Africa’s
historical economic underperformance once prices
fall. In the view of these pessimists, Africa, the home
of one-third of the world’s resource-dependent economies, has been mired in a high degree of corruption
and dependence on resource rent from which it has
yet to escape. They still consider Africa as a target for
aid, rather than trade and investment. Consequently,
they still view Africa more as a social responsibility
investment, rather than a real opportunity for yield.49
While this point about the cost of corruption is
partly valid, most of the statistical evidence supports
the optimists’ view that relative progress has been
made and that the importance of high commodity
prices has been overstated. It is undeniably true that
soaring prices for oil, minerals, and other commodities
have helped lift Africa’s GDP since 2000. However,
the McKinsey Global Institute estimated in 2010 that
natural resources directly accounted for just 24 percent of the continent’s GDP growth from 2000 through
2008. By another estimate, natural resources—and the
related government spending they financed—generated just 32 percent of Africa’s GDP growth from 2000
through 2008, with the remaining two-thirds-plus
coming from other sectors.
From 2000 to 2010, Africa’s real GDP grew by
4.7 percent a year, on average—twice the pace of its
growth in the 1980s and 1990s. By 2009, Africa’s collective GDP of $1.6 trillion was roughly equal to Brazil’s
or Russia’s. Today, the continent remains among the
world’s fastest-expanding economic regions. In fact,
Africa and Asia (excluding Japan) were the only continents that grew during the recent global recession that
started in 2008.50 Though GDP growth in Sub-Saharan
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Africa slowed to 2.8 percent in 2009 after averaging
6.6 percent from 2004 to 2008, it bounced back to 5.3
percent in 2010.51 In 2011, GDP growth rose to 5.1 percent and will be 5.4 percent in 2012 and 5.3 percent in
2013, the IMF predicted.52 GDP growth is expected to
average 5 percent through 2015.53
Moreover, Africa’s economic growth since 2000
has been widespread, with 27 of its 30 largest economies expanding rapidly. Indeed, countries with and
without significant resource exports had similar GDP
growth rates. All sectors within African economies
also contributed to growth, including natural resources, finance, retail, agriculture, transportation, and telecommunications.
Drivers of Growth within Africa. We will likely never
know the thought processes that transpired in 1995 in
Chinese ministries, think tanks, and even Zhongnanhai—the residences and offices of China’s top leadership—in reformulating China’s foreign policy toward
Africa during that pivotal year. We can, however, observe what Africa has accomplished over the last 25plus years as a starting point to understand why China
has piled into Africa with such abandon. Understanding why Africa has great potential also has important
implications for whether U.S. companies should take
a new—or perhaps first—look at the continent.
This monograph argues that the continent’s improved political governance, macroeconomic stability,
microeconomic reforms, and increased globalization
have been more important to Africa’s growth surge
since 2000 than have higher commodity prices:
•	Improved Political Governance: Greater accountability from democratically elected governments brings the hope of longer-term stability
and economic growth less impeded by the sys-
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temic corruption of the past. African countries
were freed from the clientilism of the Cold
War period after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989
and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, setting
off a multiyear wave of political liberalization
that started with Benin’s national conference
in 1990.54 Since then, there has been a peace
dividend in Africa, since the average number
of serious conflicts recorded each year has
nearly halved, from 4.8 in the 1990s to 2.6 in
the 2000s.55 The Arab Spring of popular demonstrations in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya led in
2011 to the overturning of decades of autocratic
rule in North Africa. While events in Somalia
have, to greater and lesser degrees, destabilized much of the Horn of Africa, the political
situation in Sub-Saharan Africa on the whole
has improved, with several regional conflicts
being gradually resolved. In West Africa, for
example, civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone ended in recent years, and security sector
reform has been undertaken. In 2010, Guinea
and Cote d’Ivoire held democratic elections,
followed sooner or later by the victors’ ascent
to the Presidency.
•	Improved Macroeconomic Performance: Africa’s
economies grew healthier as governments reduced the average inflation rate from 22 percent in the 1990s to 8 percent after 2000. They
shrank their budget deficits by two-thirds, and,
helped by the Highly Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) initiative and Paris Club reschedulings,
trimmed their foreign debt by one-quarter. Average government debt as a percentage of GDP
was 59 percent in the 2000s, compared with
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81.9 percent in the 1990s—which means lower
debt ratios than the United States and most European nations. Between 2001 and 2010, six of
the 10 fastest growing economies in the world
were in Africa.56
•	Successful Microeconomic Reforms: Many African
countries have privatized state-owned enterprises, lowered corporate taxes, strengthened
regulatory and legal systems, and provided critical physical and social infrastructure. Nigeria
privatized more than 116 enterprises between
1999 and 2006. It also reformed its banking sector, which went from a peak of 90 banks in the
mid-2000s to 24 by the end of the decade—and
a stronger sector overall.57 Morocco and Egypt
struck free-trade agreements with major export
partners.
•	Increased Globalization: Increased foreign trade
has expanded welfare through greater export
earnings and employment and also contributed
to higher standards of living via lower-cost imports. Africa is gaining greater access to international capital: total foreign-capital flows into
Africa rose from $15 billion in 2000 to a peak of
$87 billion in 2007.58 Capital inflows are forecast
to reach $150 billion by 2015.59
Interrelated demographic and social changes are
also important drivers for Africa’s long-term growth.
Key among these will be a growing labor force, urbanization, and the rise of the middle-class African
consumer:
•	Expanding Labor Force: In contrast with much
of the world, Africa’s labor force is expanding and youthful. At present, the continent has
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more than 500 million people of working age.
By 2040, Africa will be home to one in five of
the planet’s young people and will have the
world’s largest working-age population: over
1.1 billion, more than China or India. By 2050,
Africa will have one of four workers on the
planet. Already, Africa’s median age of 19.7
years (18.6 in Sub-Saharan Africa) is considerably younger than the 29.2 years in Asia, 36.8
years in the United States, and 40.1 years in Europe.60 This youth bulge—whose productivity
has also been aided by improvements in health
and education—will also lift GDP growth. Over
the last 20 years, three-quarters of the continent’s increase in GDP per capita came from
an expanding workforce, the rest from higher
labor productivity.
•	Urbanization: In many African countries, urbanization—with its economies of scale—is
boosting productivity. In 1980, just 28 percent
of Africans lived in cities. Today, this figure is
40 percent, and is projected to rise to 50 percent
by 2030. Already, Africa has 52 cities with at
least 1 million people.61 Urbanization is spurring the construction of more roads, buildings,
water systems, and similar projects. Since 2000,
Africa’s annual private infrastructure investments have tripled, averaging $19 billion from
2006 to 2008. By 2030, the continent’s top 18
cities could have a combined annual spending
power of $1.3 trillion.
•	Rise of the Middle Class: Many Africans are joining the ranks of the world’s consumers. In 2000,
roughly 59 million households on the continent had $5,000 or more in income. By 2014,
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the number of such households could reach
106 million. By one measure, the number of
middle-class Africans rose by 27 percent from
2000.62 The number of households with discretionary income is projected to rise by 50 percent
over the next 10 years, reaching 128 million.63 If
Africa maintains its current growth trajectory,
consumers will buy $1.4 trillion worth of goods
and services in 2020, which will be a little less
than India’s projected $1.7 trillion but more
than Russia’s $960 billion.64
THE PUSH WITHIN CHINA: 1993 SHIFT TO
OIL IMPORTER LEADS TO LINKAGE OF AID/
TRADE; 2001 WTO ACCESSION LEADS TO
“GOING-OUT” POLICY
China’s trade and aid in Africa from the 1950s to
the late 1970s was in support of the PRC’s communist, anti-colonial ideology. Since then, however, there
have been four watershed events that have shifted
Beijing’s approach to the African continent from the
economy serving diplomacy to diplomacy serving the
economy:
•	1978: Deng Xiaoping Launches “Reform and
Opening Policy.” Since 1978, China has moved
much closer to a market economy, in which
profits, not political agendas, have driven most
of the economic and trade activities. Over the
course of time, China’s relations with African
countries have also been restructured from being anti-colonial brothers-in-arms to economic
and trade partners based on market principles.65
•	1993: Faced with declining domestic oil production and skyrocketing demand spurred by
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rapid industrialization, China became a net importer of oil and began to seek diversified suppliers, including African.
•	1995: Reflecting China’s need for greater natural resource inputs for industrialization, the
State Council mandated that the Ministry of
Commerce combine African aid, trade, and
investment.66 The State Council also directed
China’s state-owned companies to launch a
number of trade, investment, and development centers across Africa. Each center was
to be built and operated independently by an
experienced Chinese company with extensive
business interests in that country. In December
1995, Complant, a state-owned enterprise newly independent from the Ministry, opened the
first trade, investment, and development center
in Guinea. At least 10 other centers followed.
Consistent with the State Council’s mandate,
the Ministry also directed its municipal and
provincial branches to organize delegations of
outstanding enterprises to travel to Africa.
•	2001: China was admitted to the WTO—a
turning point in its nominal acceptance of the
Western, rules-based international economic
system.67 That same year, and under the leadership of Premier and economic czar Zhu Rongji,
China’s 10th 5-year plan formalized the directive for Chinese companies to go global, expand into new markets, build up the country’s
fledgling multinational corporations, and aid
its domestic restructuring by pushing mature
sunset industries offshore.68
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Another push factor has been the desire to seek
higher returns on China’s huge savings. In terms of
portfolio theory, China has been looking for the lowestrisk, highest-return options for the recycling of China
dollars that represent its huge trade surplus, much as
Middle East oil producers recycled petrodollars into
the world economy in the 1970s. In a certain sense, the
aggressive lending by Chinese state banks in Africa,
following the Chinese government’s foreign policy
decisions to expand commercial relations with Africa,
could also be seen as a higher-risk, higher-return bet
on the future of Africa, as well as part of an effort to
diversify a global portfolio away from shorter-term,
dollar-based financial instruments into longer-term,
non-U.S. assets.
This may prove to be a smart bet for China: McKinsey Global Institute has calculated that foreign investments in Africa have yielded, on average, the highest
rates of return on investment of any region—returns
that are accruing increasingly to Chinese firms while
U.S. firms sit on the sidelines. Furthermore, China
smartly expanded its own lending and investment,
continuing it during the global economic downturn in
2008—thus allowing China even better terms on new
deals.
FACTORS IN CHINA’S SUCCESS IN RAPIDLY
EXPANDING ECONOMIC TIES WITH AFRICA
The second “big picture” question posed about the
China-Africa economic relationship is, “Why has China been so successful in expanding its economic relations with Africa?” We preview the following reasons
here and then offer a more-detailed discussion below.
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1. Chinese firms are becoming more globally competitive; in Africa, they offer good value for goods and
services adapted to African needs and income levels.
2. China has carried out superior economic diplomacy in Africa, characterized by heads-of-state summits; high-level bilateral visits; a universal diplomatic
presence; strong advocacy for bilateral trade, investment, and tax agreements; and symbolic diplomacy.
3. China has vastly expanded its soft power in Africa, including expanded scholarships and training,
an international visitor program, cultural centers, and
a new volunteer corps.
4. China’s development assistance programs—official aid, preferential trade credits, and development
finance—are all tied to China’s commercial interests,
but divorced from political/governance issues (with
the exception of supporting Beijing’s “One China”
policy). China’s assistance is consistent with its mercantilist, state-led development model, but it runs
contrary to international/OECD aid norms and free
rides on HIPC and Paris Club debt relief.
5. China’s already internationally competitive construction sector has benefited greatly from a renewed
emphasis among donors and African governments
on building infrastructure, winning international and
national tenders, as well as associated aid contracts
from its own government—the significant majority of
which are infrastructure-related.
6. Chinese firms, both large and small, come from
a business culture in China where bribery is endemic.
Combined with African countries where corruption
is rampant, and not constrained by the OECD’s antibribery convention, Chinese firms have been hypershrewd at deal making.
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Chinese Firms Are Becoming Globally Competitive.
China is not the “world’s factory” for nothing. Before a discussion of a series of what may appear to
be harsh criticisms of Chinese government policies
and business practices, it is important to recognize
that Chinese firms are becoming better and better at
what they do. Just over 10 years after Beijing started
its “going-out” policy, more and more Chinese companies are competing successfully in Africa and have
established the distribution and service channels that
will poise them for further success. When I arrived in
Lubumbashi in 1987 to start my Foreign Service career
at the U.S. Consulate-General there, I was told that
the last Chinese restaurant in town had closed a few
months before—a sure sign that the region’s mining
industry had hit hard times. The relatively few Chinese products visible in the marketplace were decidedly low tech: cheap enamelware for food products
and household plastic products. Today, the Chinese
have returned to Lubumbashi in force, as Chinese
firms have invested heavily in mining operations in
Katanga Province, while Chinese consumer products,
from electronics to cars, are everywhere.
The main competitive advantage of most Chinese
companies vis-à-vis Western and other Asian producers is their lower costs, aided by the core of Beijing’s
mercantilist policies: a deliberately undervalued currency. For manufactured goods, this cost advantage
also often comes from huge economies of scale at factories in China. For service providers in Africa, the
cost advantage comes from lower labor costs. Chinese
managers and engineers, for example, have lower
salaries and live in more modest conditions compared
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with their highly compensated Western counterparts.
Some Chinese companies, such as in the telecommunication and construction sectors, deliver goods and
services at attractive prices because they have adapted
(and in some cases stolen) technology from elsewhere
and/or become experienced at what they do. Western
electronic giants such as Hewlett-Packard, Motorola,
Siemens, and Ericsson are increasingly losing business to Chinese telecommunication companies such
as Huawei and ZTE, which were active in 2010 in 50
African countries—providing more third-generation
or better networks in over 30 African countries, and
fiber-optic networks and e-government networks in
over 20 African countries.69
The days when U.S. firms could win large construction contracts in Africa—such as Morrison-Knudsen’s
contract to build the Inga-Shaba dam in the DRC in the
1970s—now seem like a distant memory. So successful
have Chinese firms become in African infrastructure
development that, prior to the publication of guidelines prohibiting government-owned enterprises of
any nationality competing for U.S. taxpayer-funded
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) contracts,
a Chinese state-owned engineering and construction
company, Sinohydro, was awarded the two largest
projects in the MCC compact with Mali: $71.6 million for improvements to the Bamako International
Airport and $46.3 million for expansion of irrigation
canals along the Niger River.70
The bottom line is that Chinese products and services have crowded out Western firms in all but the
small upper-end luxury market in Africa.71 Mthuli
Ncube, Chief Economist at the African Development
Bank Group, estimated that Chinese firms accounted
for 40 percent of the corporate contracts signed in Af-
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rica in 2010, versus only 2 percent for U.S. firms.72 Not
surprisingly, the lightning-fast expansion of Chinese
interests in Africa has led to strong criticism, particularly in Western venues where the loss of the continent as a private “chasse gardée” is eyed jealously.73
China’s Superior Economic Diplomacy with Africa.
A second competitive advantage of Chinese companies is that Beijing’s official assistance to its companies in Africa has been multifaceted and, taken together, clearly superior to that provided by Western
governments. As noted, in 1995, China’s State Council
directed its Commerce Ministry to revamp its Africa
policy, emphasizing the linkage between aid and
trade. By the late 1990s, the most senior leadership in
China’s government and Communist party began to
involve itself directly in the country’s economic diplomacy with Africa. Five key characteristics of Chinese
economic diplomacy in Africa include:
a. Heads-of-State Summits: The Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation (FOCAC) is the embodiment of
China’s new, higher-level political engagement with
Africa. This heads-of-state forum, which was modeled along the lines of the Franco-African summit
process, started with an initial conference in Beijing
in 2000. The second, third, fourth, and fifth triennial
FOCACs were held in 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2012 respectively, in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Beijing, Sharm
El Sheikh (Egypt), and again in Beijing. Through FOCAC, Beijing has set out 3-year engagement plans
toward the continent in the form of strategic initiatives and commitments—”deliverables” amounting
to multi-billions of dollars in aid and investment. The
PRC’s “state capitalism” approach is unique in that
the government is able to make sweeping pronounce34

ments often on behalf of its business sector to invest
and commit capital to Africa. This is possible only because of the political economy of China, wherein the
government is still able to maintain direct control over
key sectors of its economy and leading state-owned
companies.74
One African minister responsible for economic affairs told me in November 2011 that the United States
should stop complaining about China’s commercial
successes in Africa and start promoting its own business interests more effectively.75 One reason for China’s success, he explained, was that Beijing’s leaders
were far more attentive to the need to court African
leaders. At FOCAC Summits, China’s leaders spend
2 full days with all African heads of state. The Indians have also started inviting African heads of state to
their own summits (in New Delhi in April 2008, and
Addis Ababa in May 2011), the minister noted, so why
not the United States?
b. Personal Diplomacy with African Elites through
High-Level Bilateral Visits: China has also based its
foreign diplomacy in Africa principally, but not exclusively, on establishing personal relationships with
African elites. Again, the PRC’s modus operandi is
similar to that of France, in that foreign policymakers
in Paris have built relations with former colonies in
Africa around a network of personal ties with individual African leaders, bolstered by a web of bilateral
agreements in trade, finance, development assistance,
and defense.76 The style of PRC diplomacy with Africa
reflects Chinese culture, with its emphasis on rank,
personal connections, and “face” and gift-giving. This
style is also particularly effective in Africa because of
its similarity to African cultural norms, including, unfortunately, baksheesh—the willingness to give and
insistence on receiving bribes as “gifts.”
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The Chinese leadership has been politically dexterous in the way it courts African leaders. China’s
President, Hu Jintao, has made six trips to multiple
African countries—two as vice president and four as
president. President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister
Wen Jiabao have visited more than two dozen African countries, and made visits to Africa as least three
times as often as Presidents Bush and Obama.77 Each
year since 1991, China’s foreign minister has made
his first visit abroad to an African country. Consistent
with this, in January 2012, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, and Namibia. In their
interactions with African leaders, Chinese officials repeatedly stress the “win-win” rhetoric of a partnership
with “mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefit.”78
By holding political and business summits such as the
various Sino-African forums and arranging state visits by high-ranking Chinese political officials, Beijing
symbolically accords Africa equal diplomatic status
with the dominant world powers. For their part, African elites are deeply appreciative of being given the
red carpet treatment whenever they turn up in Beijing.79
Moreover, China has another layer of high-level
contacts—senior Communist Party of China officials—that frequently visit Africa to expand relations
with African party and executive branch officials. The
United States has no similar counterpart, nor does it
rely as heavily on presidential and vice presidential
visits to Africa. If you exclude annual visits to UN
headquarters in New York by African leaders, where
some do have meetings with the American President,
Chinese leaders extend far more invitations to African
leaders to visit China than the United States does to
visit Washington. Additionally, the Communist Party
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of China frequently invites leaders of African political
parties to visit China.80 In the March 2012 testimony
before Congress, the President of the Corporate Council on Africa put it this way:
China understands the importance of Africa to its
future. . . . The most important Chinese government
officials visit Africa annually and they send many delegations of Chinese leaders to Africa every year. One
need only note that the last visit of a U.S. Secretary
of Commerce to Africa was in 2002 to understand the
implications of this.81

PRC national Yun Sun, Visiting Fellow at the
Brookings Institution’s Northeast Asia Policy Studies
program, asserted at a November 2011 conference that
Africa was not important to Chinese national interests.
One clear indicator of this, she stated, was the fact
that the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee (of nine members) had held only two
meetings in the last 4 years specifically about Africa:
one related to Darfur, and the second about the evacuation of some 30,000 Chinese nationals from Libya
in March 2011.82 Comments like this should be taken
with a grain of salt: senior Chinese leaders regularly
travel to Africa, and receive African leaders in Beijing.
African nations may be relatively less high profile to
Beijing, but they are important to China nonetheless—
and increasingly so.
c. PRC’s “Universal” Diplomatic Presence in Africa; Taiwan Loses Battle of “Dollar Diplomacy”: China has diplomatic relations with 50 of the 54 African
countries. Only four smaller nations—Burkina Faso,
Swaziland, Gambia, and São Tomé and Principe—recognize Taipei. Beijing has an embassy in all but one
of these 50 countries. The exception is Somalia, where
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the security situation in Mogadishu precludes a physical presence. All 50 African countries that recognize
China, except the Comoros and the recently independent South Sudan, also have embassies in Beijing, 83
often in chanceries provided by the Chinese government. China’s “universal” presence in Africa—and the
support to Chinese business that flows from them—is
one more reason why the United States should not be
tempted to close any embassies in Africa, regardless
of current budgetary difficulties.
d. Protecting China’s Trade, Investment, and Tax
Interests in Africa: China has carried out active economic diplomacy in Africa to protect its commercial
interests. The Chinese government has established 11
Trade Promotion Centers.84 This expansion contrasts
sharply with the U.S. Department of Commerce, which
has closed some of its offices in Africa in recent years.
Beijing has also signed bilateral trade agreements with
45 African countries, bilateral investment treaties with
33 African countries, and double taxation agreements
with 11 African countries.85 According to the 12th
Five-Year Plan, China will continue to promote agreements with African governments for the protection of
investments and the avoidance of double taxation.86
e. Symbolic Diplomacy: Prestige projects have also
played an important part in securing agreements with
African governments, and African capitals throughout the continent are filled with stadiums and government buildings built by China. This form of symbolic
diplomacy has great appeal to African elites, who welcome the opportunity to replace colonial-era buildings.87 As the African Union (AU) matured and grew
in importance as an institution following its founding
in 2002, Beijing cleverly exercised the ultimate act of
symbolic diplomacy: the donation to the AU of a new,
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800-million-renminbi (RMB) ($124 million) headquarters building, which was inaugurated in January 2012.
How should the U.S. Government respond to China’s superior economic diplomacy? One option would
be to raise the level of its engagement with Africa,
making it less episodic and more sustained. This could
start at the top. For example, the next U.S. President
could personally host a U.S.-Africa Summit for Heads
of State, much as is done already by France, China,
and India. U.S. Cabinet members, such as the Commerce, Energy, and Treasury Secretaries, could make
more frequent visits to the continent, accompanied by
U.S. business delegations. Better funding for the U.S.
Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Insurance
Corporation (OPIC), and the Trade Development Administration (TDA) is another obvious answer. The
United States could better fund the Department of
Commerce’s Foreign Commercial Service (FCS), or
even return it to the State Department, where it was
originally located until 1979.88 The State Department,
through its embassies in Africa, has an on-the-ground
presence in virtually all African capitals and a handful of constituent posts, and thus, has a far greater
network of offices on the continent than does FCS.
(The United States has embassies in every country in
Africa except for the two island nations of Comoros
and Seychelles, narco-state Guinea-Bissau, and wartorn Somalia; China has embassies in every country
where it has diplomatic relations [four still maintain
ties with Taiwan] except Somalia.) However, the U.S.
Department of Commerce maintains U.S. Commercial
Service Offices in only eight African countries, three
of which are in North Africa, while the Chinese Ministry of Commerce has Commercial Counselors in 48 of
its Embassies in Africa.89
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Commercial diplomacy should be made an explicit part of the promotion criteria for all State Department Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), with mandatory
training in commercial advocacy provided to all Ambassadors, Deputy Chiefs of Missions, and Economic/
Commercial officers before they arrive at Post. U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s October 14, 2011,
speech was an excellent statement of the importance
of economic statecraft to the United States, but the key
will be action, including a fundamental change in the
mindset of the U.S. Foreign Service—it must come to
understand, like the Chinese—that national strength
ultimately depends on economic strength and that
commercial advocacy is thus central to the work of
U.S. diplomats. As Secretary Clinton put it:
Our foreign and economic relations remain indivisible. Only now, our great challenge is not deterring
any single military foe, but advancing our global leadership at a time when power is more often measured
and exercised in economic terms.

China Boosting Its Soft Power in Africa.
A third reason for China’s newly found success
in Africa is its expanded development and use of soft
power. Since the first FOCAC Summit in 2000, China
has made a systematic effort to expand its soft power
policies in Africa.90 This soft power builds goodwill
and minimizes possible negative reactions on the continent to the growing influence of its corporations and
citizens. If China’s summit- and relationship-based
diplomacy in Africa was learned from France, several
elements of its soft power diplomacy are lifted from
the U.S. diplomatic playbook:
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•	Scholarships, Training: China’s training of Africans, including diplomats and journalists, is
a part of its soft power diplomacy. At the 2009
FOCAC Summit, China announced its intention
to increase to 4,000 the number of full scholarships it offers to African students each year.91
Beijing even funds sports teams and provides
equipment for aspiring African Olympians.92
•	Cultural Centers: In 2001, China had only four
cultural centers attached to its embassies in Africa, including one in Cotonou, Benin. Ten years
later, there are at least 22 Confucius Institutes
in 19 countries in Africa that focus on teaching
Chinese language, culture, and history, and the
number continues to grow.
•	News Media Influence: China is increasing its
radio transmissions to Africa in various languages, has set up a transmitting facility in
Kenya, and has rebroadcast arrangements with
countries around the continent. In January 2012,
China Central TV (CCTV) started English-language news broadcasts to Africa from its new
studios in Nairobi, Kenya, with programs such
as “Africa Live,” “Talk Africa,” and “Faces of
Africa.” CCTV hopes to build a network of 14
news bureaus in Africa and, by 2015, broadcast
24 hours a day to the continent.93 The Xinhua
news service has more than 20 bureaus in Africa and regional offices in Cairo and Nairobi.
Xinhua competes directly with Reuters, AP,
and Bloomberg for reporting on events in Africa. A number of sources for this monograph
were based on Xinhua reporting.
•	Volunteer Corps: More recently, Beijing has expanded its foreign assistance program in Africa
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to include a Chinese volunteer youth corps,
mirroring services of the U.S. Peace Corps.94
•	International Visitor Programs: Historically,
the United States has identified young emerging African leaders, both political and economic, for exchange programs in the United States
under the “International Visitors Program.”
China is now doing the same thing—identifying members of parliament, local entrepreneurs, and well-placed government officials in
such key ministries as Foreign Affairs, Internal
Affairs, and Trade and Commerce for training
and exchange programs in Beijing.95
Beijing’s Development Assistance: Mercantilist,
Governance Neutral, and a Tool for China’s Economic and Political Diplomacy.
A fourth factor in China’s economic success in
Africa is that Beijing’s official aid, preferential trade
credits, and development finance have been both mercantilist, i.e., tied to Chinese commercial interests, and
governance neutral—not tied to specific African government policies (except the “One China” policy). As
such, these policies pose a fundamental challenge to
existing norms governing international aid architecture. Existing international norms are embodied in the
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
guidelines, which have emphasized transparency,
with conditionality tied only to good governance (and
not to the providing nation’s goods and services).96
In sharp contrast, China’s aid, export credit, and development finance policies are opaque and tied to the
purchase of Chinese goods and services.97 One American scholar defended China’s aid policies, writing
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that “China may wind up supporting some dictatorial
and corrupt regimes, but—and this is an inconvenient
truth—the West also supports such regimes when it
advances its interests.”98 But this view ignores the fact
that the United States also raises human rights issues
with all regimes, including China and all nations of
Africa, admittedly more discreetly with oil-rich countries such as Equatorial Guinea, but also very publicly
in a blunt annual human rights report for each country. Obviously, China does not do this.
China’s export-promotion policies have come under fire for allegedly using cheap credit to provide its
goods and services exporters with an unfair advantage in staking out a dominant position in Africa.99
Critics assert that Beijing’s zero- or low-interest export credits violate OECD rules—an accusation that
would be valid, except that China is not a member of
that organization and thus has no obligation to follow
its rules. Under the voluntary 1978 Arrangement on
Officially Supported Export Credits, concessional export credits from OECD governments were supposed
to be limited to projects that were not commercially
viable: the construction of public goods like primary
schools or health clinics.100 China EXIM Bank’s website stresses that its export buyer’s credits generally
follow the Arrangement, even though China is not an
OECD member.
Whether fair or not, China has vastly expanded the
amount of export credit and development finance targeting Africa, and this is helping to fuel Chinese firms’
success on the continent. China’s cumulative foreign
aid of $11.5 billion since the 1950s has already been
surpassed by loans from China EXIM Bank to Africa,
which were $5 billion from 2007 to 2009 alone. China
EXIM’s cumulative loans to Africa are expected to to-
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tal $20 billion by 2012. For its part, China Development Bank said in September 2010 that it had already
disbursed $5.6 billion to 35 projects in more than 30
African countries, and made cumulative commitments of over $10 billion.101
China announced at the Fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference, held in November 2009 in Egypt, that
it would provide $10 billion of preferential loans to
Africa from 2010 to 2012. According to a 2010 State
Council White Paper, this will be composed of $3 billion in preferential loans, $2 billion in preferential
export buyer’s credits, and $5 billion toward the establishment of the China-Africa Development Fund,
which is designed to encourage and support Chinese
companies investing in projects in Africa. The White
Paper said that examples of major projects that will
receive preferential credits include an airport in Mauritius, housing in Equatorial Guinea, and the Bui Hydropower Station in Ghana. The White Paper also
indicated that China would provide credits of up to
$1 billion to Chinese financial institutions for the development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
in Africa.102
China’s Aid Positive As Well: Emphasis on
Infrastructure Investments Fills Important
Development Gap.
A fifth factor in China’s success in Africa has been
its emphasis on building infrastructure, which has
been a boon to China’s already internationally competitive construction industry. The World Bank has estimated that Africa needs $20 billion in infrastructure
investments annually, and has a shortfall of about $10
billion a year.103 Some academics, and some African
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leaders such as former President of Mozambique Joaquim Chissano, have blamed the West for worsening
this gap in African infrastructure needs by singularly
focusing on social development needs, as exemplified by UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
negotiated in 2000. Whatever the case, Africans themselves recognized the need for more infrastructure in
formulating their New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001, and China—which kicked
off its “going-out” policy that same year—was ready
to help fill Africa’s infrastructure shortfall.
Over the last 10 years, China has become the major
builder in Africa, winning international contracts and
dedicating much of its own aid to infrastructure projects. “China is able to build a railway before the World
Bank would get around to doing a cost-benefit analysis,” one Western diplomat said.104 After Liberia’s war
ended, President Johnson Sirleaf repeatedly said that
her number one priority was getting roads financed.
According to adviser Steven Radelet, “No one was doing it. They all said ‘we don’t do roads’. But the Chinese ambassador said: ‘We’ll do roads’.”
Worldwide, over 60 percent of China EXIM Bank’s
concessional loans have been committed to infrastructure projects, and this percentage is likely similar or
higher for its credits to Africa.105 U.S. Senator Chris
Coons, who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, estimated in November 2011 that about 70 percent of Chinese assistance
to Africa comes in the form of roads, stadiums, and
government buildings—often built with Chinese material and labor—while 70 percent of U.S. Government
spending there goes on crucial but less visible support
for people, particularly to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria,
tuberculosis, and other diseases.106

45

According to China’s State Council, by the end of
2009, Beijing had provided assistance for the construction of over 500 infrastructure projects in Africa.107 In
recent years, China has signed loan agreements with
Angola for about $14.5 billion (2004 and later) and
the DRC for $6.5 billion (2009)—many of which were
infrastructure-related. In September 2010, China and
Ghana signed loans valued at about $15 billion. Most
of this money will be used to finance roads, dams, refineries, buildings, railways, etc., by Chinese construction companies, and some will be repaid in oil or minerals.108 The China-Africa Development Fund (CADF)
provided a $100 million loan to assist Ethiopia to complete a railway networking system that links Addis
Ababa to various regions of the country.109 The China
Development Bank (CDB) is to fund construction of
a cement factory in Mozambique’s Maputo Province,
costing $100 million.
China’s emphasis on infrastructure has paid huge
dividends. China has become the hydropower, road,
rail, and bridge builder of Africa. In 2008, Chinese
companies had nearly 3,000 engineering contracts in
Africa, valued at close to $40 billion.110 Some 187,396
Chinese were officially working in Africa in 2009, most
on the large engineering contracts in Algeria, Libya,
and Angola. Although there are exceptions, such as
Angola, most of China’s engineering business in Africa is not actually financed by the Chinese government,
but by African governments, development banks, bilateral banks, and private companies contracting with
Chinese firms. Including contracts for the private
sector and international community, Chinese companies now earn revenues of over $20 billion annually
from construction and engineering contracts on the
continent.
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In other words, the Chinese not only believe in integrating aid and trade into their own development
assistance policy, but also in taking advantage as
much as possible of the untied aid provided by other
countries and the international financial institutions.
Since China does not accede to OECD DAC rules, it
enjoys the free ride of taking advantage of the West’s
negotiated policies of untying aid without providing
reciprocal access to Western construction companies
to Beijing’s aid contracts. In fairness, the Chinese are
also strong at providing internationally competitive
construction and engineering services, and win a significant share of open tenders carried out according
to international norms. The Africans themselves win
both from China’s tied aid, and from Chinese construction companies providing badly needed infrastructure with the least amount of development aid.
Corruption, Flouting of Labor, Environmental
Laws: China’s Illicit Competitive Advantages
in Africa.
In a sense, the sixth factor in China’s success in Africa is its most corrosive: illegal behavior such as the
use of bribery and corruption to advance its political
and economic interests, and the flouting of labor and
environmental laws to lower its cost of doing business. Chinese state-owned enterprises, private corporations, and individual citizens are systematically
using corruption, a form of cumshaw, to win business
deals in Africa, and are not subject to restrictions such
as Washington’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Since
under-the-table transactions are inherently hard to
prove, we can only assert that:
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•	Corruption is endemic at all levels in China, a
societal problem against which the Communist
Party inveighs regularly because it represents
a serious source of social discontent and thus a
threat to the Party’s continued hold on power;
•	Chinese companies transfer their corrupt practices abroad, including a gift-giving culture of
corruption that is ingrained in China’s business
culture.
Not surprisingly, Chinese companies are the second most likely (after India) to use payola abroad,
according to Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index. In terms of African partners, a World Bank
survey of 68 countries in 2007 found that Sub-Saharan
Africa leads in the “percentage of firms expected to
give gifts” to secure government contracts. This corrupt meeting of the minds has facilitated China’s “hyper-efficient deal making in Africa,” as one observer
put it.111
The poster child for questionable Chinese business
practices in Africa may belong to a firm dubbed the
“Queensway Syndicate,” which was founded by wellconnected Cantonese entrepreneurs.112 This syndicate,
with its African partners, has signed contracts worth
billions of dollars for oil, minerals, and diamonds
from Africa. Operating out of offices in Hong Kong’s
Queensway, the syndicate calls itself China International Fund, or China Sonangol. Almost all of China’s
imports of oil from Angola—worth more than $20 billion last year—come from China Sonagol. The son of
Angolan President Dos Santos is said to be a director
of China Sonangol. According to the IMF and World
Bank, billions of dollars have disappeared from Sonangol’s accounts. In Guinea, the syndicate came to
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the rescue of the military junta then in power, with a
reported transfer of funds of $100 million. The junta
eventually fell, however, and following the first democratic elections in Guinea’s 50-year history in 2010, the
syndicate’s $7 billion minerals deal is now in limbo.
Sometimes a corruption problem becomes so high
profile that Beijing’s Foreign Ministry officials feel
compelled to repudiate actions that China’s increasingly independent public and private enterprises take,
such as the Queensway minerals deal in 2007 with the
increasingly isolated military regime in Guinea.113
There were news reports in 2011 of similar problems,
with arms sales by Chinese state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) to the failing Qaddafi regime in Libya.
Many Africans assert that the practices of Chinese
companies are not all that different from the practices
of European investors.114 While this may have been
true in the past for Europeans, it is certainly less so
now. Most European nations have signed on to the
OECD anti-bribery agreement that was championed
in the 1990s by the United States. This agreement, as
implemented by each member-state, provides for fines
and even criminal penalties for firms that pay bribes
abroad. While bribery by some Western firms undoubtedly continues, the OECD anti-bribery convention has likely reduced corruption by Western firms,
thereby serving up another competitive advantage for
Chinese companies that are not bound by this convention and feel no compunction over giving bribes, especially in Africa, where the chances of being caught and
punished are almost nonexistent.
Without improved governance at home, China,
its companies, and its citizens will continue to be opportunistic, exploiting weaker African nation-states
in their quest for markets and profits.115 Former South
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African President Thabo Mbeki, whose country is
both a strategic competitor and partner of China, felt
compelled to publicly state just after a FOCAC summit that the continent should beware of trading traditional Western modes of dominance for a Chinese version.116 Africa’s elites must thus act wisely on behalf
of their citizenry, with an eye toward mutual benefit
that defends their own countries’ interests with fairness to China. Zambian President Michael Sata, who
was elected in September 2011, will hopefully be one
such wise leader. He used anti-Chinese slogans in
two presidential campaigns, and was elected on his
second try. While calling for a rise in the minimum
wage in an attempt to resolve a strike against Chinese firms that occurred shortly after his taking office,
President Sata also moved quickly to reassure some
investors about previous campaign slogans. His first
meeting with a foreign official after being elected was
with the Chinese Ambassador in Lusaka—whom Sata
reportedly reassured about his welcoming of Chinese
investment.117
ARE AFRICA’S NEW DEBTS TO CHINA
SUSTAINABLE?
A third “big-picture” question posed is whether
China is creating a new debt burden for Africa. China’s massive trade surpluses and capital reserves
provided Africa with a new ability to offer largescale finance, just as African countries were finally
successful in getting multilateral debt relief through
the HIPC program.118 While most Africans welcome
China’s emergence as a major creditor, many Western
observers warn that Chinese banks—consistent with
Beijing’s mercantilist philosophy—are “free-riding”
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on the debt-reduction generosity of Western donors
by extending new loans to low-income countries.
These observers assert that Beijing has created a wave
of new debt that is only minimally offset by the debts
that China has forgiven in some African countries.119
Moreover, since Chinese loans lack transparency, it is
impossible for outsiders to understand how they fit
into the African borrower’s debt sustainability frameworks developed with the IMF and World Bank.120
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao announced in November
2009 that China planned to cancel 168 debts owed by
33 African countries, but did not announce the total
amount of this proposed debt relief.121
China EXIM Bank President and CEO Li Ruogu
has argued that his bank takes into consideration both
debt and development sustainability in making lending decisions in Africa.122 As the EXIM Bank’s chief
economist told an audience at a World Bank retreat:
“It’s the new lenders’ problem if countries can’t repay,
not the Paris Club. We know we need a good, strong
balance sheet.”
One important way that China mitigates the risk
of its loans is by tying its provision of credit to a commodity offtake agreement in the contracting African
country—a technique commonly referred to as the
“Angola Model.” Under this technique, the borrowing country agrees to pay back the loan in the form of
the sale of commodities, such as oil, that it produces.
China’s EXIM Bank has pledged oil-backed financing
of some $14.5 billion for the Angolan government’s
ambitious post-war reconstruction program, including over 100 projects in the areas of energy, water,
health, education, telecommunications, fisheries, and
public works.123 These projects are predominantly (70
percent) undertaken by Chinese contractors.124 There
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are signs that the limits of this model may have been
reached, however, at least within Angola. Some Angolans have complained that the infrastructure-for-oil
deals with China have shackled their oil revenues to
repaying Chinese loans. As a result, the government
is looking to limit its exposure to further oil-backed
loans with the Chinese.125
It appears that China’s trade credits and development loans are being used productively in most countries, which suggests that these new debts will not
create an unsustainable burden. One such country is
Ghana. Ghana’s fortunes changed when Tullow Oil
struck oil in June 2007. Not coincidentally, 2 months
later, the China Export Bank (CEB) signed an agreement with Ghana extending a hybrid package of $270
million in concessional loans and $292 million in export buyers’ credits to fund the Bui Dam, a hydroelectric project with an anticipated capacity of 400 MW.
The loan was arranged to be paid back over a period of
20 years with cocoa exports.126 During President John
Atta Mills’s state visit to China in September 2010, an
agreement was signed with Chinese financial institutions for almost $13 billion more in loans to Ghana.
Some $3 billion in loans extended by CDB will be used
to develop the country’s oil and gas infrastructure,
and $9.77 billion channeled toward roads, railways,
schools, and hospitals.
One way that China is providing capital to Africa without adding to the continent’s debt load is by
making equity investments. For example, the China
Africa Development Fund is an equity investor with
the Government of Ghana and Bosai Minerals Group
in a Sekondi industrial estate that will be anchored by
a proposed aluminum refinery. Ghana has long been
a producer of bauxite, mined by large Western firms.
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As Ghana’s Minister of Trade and Industry put it,
the Chinese project “will allow our country to finally
achieve our long-term objective of establishing an integrated aluminium industry and make the most of
our resources.”127
Ghana may also be an example of how infrastructure loans such as those offered by China can act as an
agency of restraint in poor, resource-rich countries by
ensuring that at least some of these countries’ natural resource wealth is spent on development investments.128 In other words, African countries opt to invest
in their infrastructure—usually a good investment in
the productivity of an economy—and make sure that
it can pay back this debt by committing itself to offtake
agreements involving its exportable commodities. (As
discussed below, these offtake agreements can raise
special economic and security concerns when they involve strategic minerals.)
At the same time, Chinese loans can also subvert
the discipline that African countries might accept
under their own country development plans worked
out with the assistance of the IMF and World Bank. In
2004, Angola suddenly broke off negotiations with the
IMF, characterizing its conditions as “humiliating”
and announced that China’s EXIM Bank had agreed
to give Angola a $2 billion line of credit to be repaid
over 12 years.129 Paul Wolfowitz, former head of the
World Bank, was strongly critical of the Chinese role
in Chad, where a carefully negotiated loan by the Bank
aimed at ensuring that a portion of resources would
be diverted to poverty reduction had been summarily
scrapped by the government after promises of Chinese credit.130
China’s new trade credits and development loans
could allow Africans to make wise investments in their
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future, or be diverted to questionable projects that allow elites to abandon efforts to improve governance.
Which choice to make ultimately falls to African leaders.
WILL AFRICA BE ABLE TO INDUSTRIALIZE
BECAUSE OF OR DESPITE CHINA?
One of the key issues surrounding China’s rapidly
expanding economic footprint in Africa is whether the
Chinese will ultimately help—or hurt—chances for
Africa to lift incomes through industrialization. Will
Africa’s modest progress in industrialization be gutted by competition from China, e.g., in textiles; or will
Africa become more competitive, perhaps with the
help of FDI, including Chinese companies relocated
from the PRC to lower-cost locations in Africa?
The impediments to African industrialization are
mainly within Africa itself. While the image of Africa
is of extremely low wages, Africa’s diversified economies actually have higher unit-labor costs—defined as
wages divided by labor productivity—than do China
or India. Even when factories in certain countries in
Africa are as productive as those in China and India,
overall costs tend to be higher because of corruption,
burdensome regulation, and poor infrastructure.131 Africa’s share of labor-intensive manufacturing is actually shrinking, according to a July 2011 UN report. The
World Bank has talked with Chinese trade officials on
how to move more factories to Africa from China. The
Bank estimates that there are now 85 million manufacturing jobs suitable for unskilled workers in China,
out of a population of 1.3 billion, but only 10 million in
all of Africa, with a population of 1 billion.132
Despite Africa’s higher costs, there is increasing
anecdotal evidence that China is a net boon to African
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industrialization. A PRC government survey of 1,600
Chinese companies indicated that they were increasingly using Africa as an industrial base, sometimes
because countries have made industrial investment
a precondition for resource deals. Manufacturing’s
share of total Chinese investment in Africa (22 percent) is catching up fast with mining’s (29 percent).
In some parts of Africa—notably Nigeria and East
Africa—manufacturing has become a key sector for
Chinese investment.133 Chinese home appliance giant,
Haier, joined with a firm linked to the Greek diaspora
in West Africa in a joint venture in Lagos, Nigeria, to
assemble ozone-friendly refrigerators. Chinese investment is helping to rejuvenate plastics manufacturing
in the northern Nigerian city of Kano.134 In East Africa,
Chery Automobile is to become the second Chinese
vehicle maker to build an assembly plant in Kenya,
joining truck manufacturer Beiqi Foton Motors.135 The
firm is discussing $50 million in loans with the Chinese
government to invest in Kenya through an assembly
plant. The new assemblers are looking to use Kenya
as the launching pad for entry into the regional common market, the East African Community (EAC). The
fragmented economies of the five East African countries had discouraged auto producers from setting up
assembly plants, but the common market has made it
possible for the producers to capture a regional market of more than 130 million residents. The firm sold
a modest 120 cars last year, but aims to produce 1,000
units in 2013. In Ethiopia, two out of three resident
Chinese firms are manufacturers.136 One of China’s
leaders in telecom, ZTE, announced a joint venture in
mobile phone assembly in Ethiopia, where Chinese
companies are also investing in pharmaceuticals.137
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Backward/Forward Integration of Mining Sector.
New evidence suggests that China’s investments
in extractive industries could enable African businesses to develop more sophisticated backward and
forward integration so as to extract more value from
processing.138 Chinese investments in extractive industries in Africa are profitable, and have led to downstream processing, such as refining of copper ore in
Zambia. Some African manufactured products, such
as aluminum, could become a viable export to China
and third markets.
Upstream Factors for Construction Sector.
Many Chinese companies initially came to Africa
to win and carry out construction contracts offered
by African governments, bilateral donors, and international financial institutions such as the World Bank
and ADB. Beyond building infrastructure, some Chinese construction companies have promoted African
industrialization through the building of upstream
factories to produce cement, bricks, glass, steel rods,
and other building materials.
Infrastructure Improvements Aid Industrialization.
Recently, many African countries, particularly in
the EAC, have taken new steps to advance regional
economic integration. China has also contributed indirectly to regional integration in Africa, and thus, the
continent’s prospects for industrialization, through
its heavy investment in infrastructure—often made in
conjunction with natural resource investments in mining sectors.
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Restructuring of the Chinese Economy
May Benefit Africa.
Africa may already be benefitting modestly from
China’s own economic restructuring. China, “the
world’s factory,” would like to move up the valueadded chain to higher-technology products, and shift
away from labor-intensive, low-tech, and high-pollution industries. Rapidly rising labor costs in China’s
coastal provinces have already led to a massive shift
in manufacturing to inland provinces such as Sichuan.
However, wages have also been rising in inland provinces, and China is reaching a tipping point, where it
is no longer competitive globally for certain labor-intensive goods. World Bank President Robert Zoellick
advised China to ship some manufacturing abroad—
something that some Chinese businesses have already
started to do out of economic necessity and tightening
environmental rules. Since 2005, for example, Beijing
and prosperous local municipalities have progressively tightened the structure of taxes, tariffs, prohibitions, and incentives to force restructuring in the
heavily polluting leather industry. One of Wenzhou’s
most prominent private companies, Hazan Shoes, invested $6 million in 2004 to set up a factory in Nigeria.
“Our boss wants to set up a shoe production cluster,
to bring the entire value chain to Nigeria,” one Chinese businessman said.139
About the same time that China’s government
ramped up policies to encourage its emerging manufacturing phenoms to expand overseas, it also began
encouraging less competitive, labor-intensive “mature” industries (such as textiles and leather goods)
to relocate to other countries.140 In July 2006, the Min-
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istries of Finance and Commerce established a special
fund that Chinese textile companies could draw on to
encourage more of them to move offshore.
African Textiles Should Have Local Value Chain,
But Chinese Competition Tough.
The issue of Africa’s broader participation in global value chains is critical. One promising area for this
ought to be in the cotton-textile-garment value chain,
which is widely seen as the stepladder for Sub-Saharan Africa’s industrial growth.141 Africa needs to start
processing local raw materials into finished goods for
export rather than exporting raw cotton and cloth.142
The problem up to now has been the high costs of production for Africa’s textile industry and fierce international competition, particularly from China.
Chinese textile exports do vie with—and usually
crowd out—African exports in third-country markets
such as the United States and the EU.143 With the end of
the Multifibre Agreement in 2005, African producers
that had established burgeoning industries in textiles
and apparel, buoyed by the preferential terms of trade
established by the African Growth and Opportunity
Act (AGOA), were rapidly swamped by Chinese competition.144 Even in the case of South Africa, which has
a relatively advanced economy, Chinese textile imports were crushing their South African competitors,
leading the Chinese to agree in 2007 to a “voluntary”
quotas on textile exports to South Africa. This measure ultimately failed, however, because other Asian
textile exporters, e.g., Vietnam, filled the gap left by
declining Chinese exports. The ultimate solution for
the South African textile industry is thus to boost its
productivity, or suffer collapse in the face of global
competition.
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Nigeria faced a similar dilemma after 2005 because
of Chinese textile imports. Nigerian manufacturers
faced higher costs, notably in energy and transport,
and were unable to compete. Yet, their difficulties ultimately proved to be domestic, linked to the chronic
inefficiency, misadministration, and corruption within Nigeria’s service industries. Similarly, one Chinese
investor complained about the challenges of manufacturing in Tanzania: an irregular out-of-phase electricity supply, which damages machinery; inadequate
water supply; high costs of nonlabor inputs such as
raw materials; and poor industrial relations.145
Special Economic Zones: Can Lessons Learned by
China Mitigate Weaknesses in Africa’s Investment
Climate?
China experimented with foreign investment, at
first in a limited number of Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) in its coastal provinces, where the central,
provincial, and even municipal governments built infrastructure (industrial parks, roads, ports, etc.) and
offered tax holidays to induce foreign investors to
come. Beijing started four SEZs in 1980, one in Fujian
Province, and three in Guangdong Province, including one at Shenzhen, just outside of Hong Kong. These
zones were phenomenally successful, and this experiment was expanded to other coastal and later inland
provinces.
At the 2006 FOCAC Summit, Beijing promised
to build SEZs in several African countries to attract
both Chinese and other foreign investment.146 While
development zones in China were owned by the central, provincial, or even municipal governments, and
were often built and operated by separate legal enti-
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ties set up for this purpose, China’s “export model”
for SEZs in Africa is taking the form of: 1) support and
subsidies from its government, mixed with; 2) marketbased decisions and investment by a combination of
Chinese state-owned and private corporations. These
African SEZs support China’s “going-global” policies
for its domestic companies, and were also part of a
broader Chinese government effort to establish up to
50 overseas SEZs under the 11th Five-Year Plan (200610).147 In addition to economic rationales, Beijing also
had political motivations for promoting SEZs abroad.
The establishment of these manufacturing zones offsets criticism that trade with China is eroding the industrial base of its Africa trading partners, and that
Chinese firms seek only to invest in Africa’s extractive
industries.148 The zones may also fulfill soft power political goals by demonstrating the efficacy of aspects of
China’s development model.
However, China’s decision to build SEZs in Africa
is intended first and foremost to reduce the costs and
risks of doing business for Chinese firms in Africa.149
In theory, SEZs will act as “safe havens” for Chinese
capital. Chinese (and other foreign) firms located in
these zones are to enjoy tax and investment incentives,
customs duty waivers for raw materials and inputs,
visas and work permit approvals for expatriate labor,
and discounted land and services.150 Some SEZs even
provide restrictions on strike activity.
In 2006 and 2007, China’s Ministry of Commerce
organized two rounds of tenders to review proposals to build six to seven SEZs in Africa. The winners
of these tenders were eligible for up to 200-300 million RMB ($30-45 million) in grants, and long-term
low-interest loans of RMB 2 billion ($300 million).
Up to now, China has built six SEZs in five African
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countries. China’s first two zones in Africa are being
built in Zambia (at Chambishi with a projected cost
of $410 million) and Mauritius (renamed Jinfei; at a
cost of $720 million). Both are sponsored by Chinese
companies with substantial investments in each country.151 There are also two zones in Nigeria (Lekki; $369
million; Ogun, $500 million for the first phase), and
one each in Egypt (Suez; cost N/A) and Ethiopia (Oriental, $101 million). (A seventh zone was planned for
Algeria, but suspended for reasons related to unexpected changes in Algier’s foreign investment laws;
some consider that a subzone in Lusaka should be
considered a second SEZ in Zambia.) In addition, the
China Africa Development Fund (CADF), an equity
fund of one of Beijing’s policy banks, China Development Bank, decided to invest a total of $100 million in
at least three of the zones (Nigeria Lekki, Mauritius,
and Egypt).
Chinese companies developing these zones include national and provincial SOEs, but also some
private firms. The zones in Ethiopia and Mauritius
are 100 percent Chinese-owned, while the others are
joint ventures, usually with African national or statelevel governments as minority partners. For example,
Nigeria’s Ogun State government owns an 18 percent
stake in the Ogun zone, while the government of Lagos State and an investment company it controls own
40 percent of the shares in the Lekki zone.152 A total of
$328 million had been spent to build infrastructure in
these SEZs as of the end of 2010.153
All of the SEZs remain in the very early stages,
with Egypt’s Suez and Zambia’s Chambishi already
in partial operation, and Nigeria’s Lekki aiming to be
fully operational by year-end 2012. None of the zones
has proceeded completely smoothly, although Zam-

61

bia comes closest. Chinese developers expect host
governments to support zone development actively;
instead, they are finding in some projects (such as in
Ethiopia) that governments allocate land to developers and do little else.154
Some observers are concerned that China’s SEZs
in Africa, instead of becoming growth nodes that
partner with African companies, train local managers
and workers, and catalyze local industry, will end up
as enclaves without any development connection to
the rest of their host countries.155 Given Africa’s weak
industrial base, however, accounting for only about
1 percent of global manufacturing, a higher priority
must be to make the zones attractive to foreign investors, both Chinese and third-country. In the shortto-medium term, this may mean less concern about
whether Africans can maximize their immediate benefit from the zones, and more about providing inducements for new foreign investors. After all, even if the
economic linkages to the rest of the country are weak,
these foreign-invested factories will produce wages
for local workers, build up their skills, and provide
tax revenue for the state (albeit reduced at least temporarily by any tax holidays). In this regard, China’s
experience is instructive. The first four SEZs were created in 1980, but by 1995 “zone fever” in China had
grown so intense that the central government had to
put the brake on new development zones (in part to
conserve arable land), and start to phase out generous
tax incentives for foreign investors.
Despite the challenges, there have already been
signs of success: by the end of 2011, 137 Chinese enterprises will have invested a total of $1.08 billion in
the six zones. Business volume of these enterprises
is predicted to reach $3.5 billion. The companies will
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also contribute $119 million dollars in tax revenues for
local governments, while creating about 10,000 jobs.156
Outside of these Chinese government-supported, official zones, there are a number of Chinese enterprises
that have established, expanded, or proposed new
industrial parks or free trade zones in Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Guinea, Uganda, Botswana, and South Africa
that are independent of government support.157
Chinese developers experienced with zone construction in China note that even in situations in
which local governments are actively facilitating a
zone, it usually takes 10-15 years before a zone reaches
maturity and “takes off.” By way of comparison, in
the United States, the Research Triangle Park in North
Carolina was founded in 1959, quickly attracted two
research companies, but floundered until 1965, when
IBM announced it would locate a research facility
there—eventually leading to the presence of 104 research companies by 1998.158
Too Early to Tell Impact of China on
African Industrialization.
On balance, the above picture is mixed, with China playing both the role of contributor to—and competitor with—African industrialization. Because most
data are limited and anecdotal, it is too early to tell
whether Africa is truly poised for an industrial takeoff. Between 1990 and 2005, Sub-Saharan Africa ended
with an average manufacturing growth rate of just
over 1.5 percent. Almost no change at all occurred in
industrial structure or movement up the value chain.
African industry has struggled to reach a sufficient
scale to compete in global markets.
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China can be a catalyst, but not a panacea for Africa’s industrialization. It is possible that more and
more Chinese textile companies will set up shop in
Africa, joining those from other sectors who have already started to do so. How Chinese companies operate their manufacturing operations in Africa will also
impact their broader contribution to African industrialization. If they cluster only in SEZs that become
ghettos of restricted labor rights, walled off from contact with domestic firms, they will contribute much
less to Africa’s sustainable transition to industrialized
economies—and will represent a tragic lost opportunity for the African countries that host them. Ultimately, however, the success of African businesses
and foreign investors in manufacturing will rest not
with China, but rather on the degree to which African
governments establish an environment more conducive for business, thereby fostering indigenous entrepreneurial activity, as well as foreign investment from
around the globe.
CHINA NOT A MONOLITH: IMPACT OF
NONSTATE CHINESE ACTORS ON AFRICA
There remains a common assumption throughout
Africa that all Chinese deals are state-led and orchestrated.159 This is untrue. In analyzing Sino-African relations, we must always keep in mind that China is
not a monolith—there are many Chinas and, similarly,
many Africas.160 As Chinese firms have gone abroad,
there has been a steady diffusion of economic power
from state-affiliated SOEs to a profit-seeking private
sector; which has introduced a diversity of interests
and practices that are as often at odds with Chinese
foreign policy aims as they are in conformity with
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them.161 Even today, some Chinese SOEs remain appendages of the government, but most have gained
a very considerable degree of autonomy (although
still under general and often loose supervision of
national, provincial, and even municipal State Asset
Administrations). Many SOEs have also been partially
privatized, with companies going public on a stock
exchange. As such, they come under pressure from
private shareholders whose interests are not aligned
with those of the State and Chinese foreign policy.
Moreover, while the Chinese leadership in Beijing
may want certain outcomes from China’s engagement
in Africa, it is also increasingly unable to control a rapidly expanding network of state-owned and privatesector actors who have entered these markets based
on the logic of globalization and profit maximization.
This network, from the most “controllable” to the
least, includes:
•	Large Chinese enterprises investing in strategic
sectors such as oil, ores, or infrastructure. Most
are state-owned and/or subsidized with Chinese grants or benefit from cheap policy loans
by state-owned banks;
•	Medium- to large-sized Chinese companies
found mainly in the manufactured goods, telecommunications, and service sectors,162 and;
•	Small firms and individual or family businesses, which are dominant in light industry, and
the wholesale and retail sectors.163
Chinese state-owned banks such as China EXIM
Bank and China Development Bank are playing increasingly large financing roles on the continent, but
they still largely cater to Chinese state companies. Private Chinese companies have often complained of the
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lack of Chinese government support in this respect.
It was in recognition of this that the Chinese government announced the launch in 2009 of a $1 billion
fund geared especially toward small- and mediumsized enterprises in Africa. Although the bigger stateowned Chinese enterprises dominate the headlines
with large-scale infrastructure and resource-related
deals, the most dynamic sector of Chinese investment
in Africa is the private entrepreneurs.
Unfortunately, and in some cases undeservedly,
Chinese companies in Africa have developed a highly
negative reputation for limited employment of Africans, limited technological transfer, and, in some
cases, uneven workmanship. Worse still, many Chinese investors have brought with them notoriously
low labor rights standards and a wholesale disregard
for the environment that mimicked the pattern of accidental injuries and deaths, periodic strikes, and longstanding ecological degradation found in China itself.
Construction firms in Zambia and Namibia have documented unfair Chinese business practices, including
collusive bidding, low wages, and a tendency to hire
contract workers so as to get around mandated labor
benefits (paid holidays, sick leave, etc.) for permanent
staff. To avoid censure, Chinese managers bribe union
bosses and take them on “study tours” (i.e., massage
parlors) in China.164 A study by Namibian labor unions
pointed out that the Chinese were following the same
practices as local African firms. European-owned
firms that adhered to local labor laws and regulations
suffered most.165
Another example of illegal business practices by
Chinese firms relates to violations of intellectual property rights. African nations do not have the institutions
to keep counterfeit and harmful products from entering their territory.166 Some Chinese manufacturers il66

licitly copy African designs, such as wax print textiles,
and then produce them more cheaply for export back
to Africa.167 These illegal products not only create economic losses for their patent holders, but they also
threaten human health and safety. Affecting U.S. companies as well as those of other nationals, counterfeit
Chinese goods have flooded the African markets, not
only undercutting those who have created the original
products and driving them out of the market, but also
creating health risks with counterfeit medicines and
false products—with Africans once again the victims
of this exploitation.
Even more problematic in the longer term is the
conduct of Chinese small and medium enterprises,
some of which deliberately flout labor and environmental standards as well as local regulations in pursuit of profit.168 Unscrupulous Chinese traders use
front companies to export illegally, everything from
timber, diamonds, and prized body parts of endangered wildlife back to China. Chinese triads (criminal
gangs) from Hong Kong have moved into Africa as
well. Triads have been implicated in the stripping of
the southern African coast of abalone (90 percent of
which is gone after only a few years), in the shark fin
and rhino horn trade, as well as in people trafficking.
Seven major triad-affiliated groups, four from Hong
Kong and three from Taiwan, have used front companies to engage in illicit trade in wildlife products.
OFFICIAL CHINA RECOGNIZES DAMAGE
IN AFRICA CAUSED BY POOR CORPORATE
CITIZENS
At the 2006 FOCAC meeting, the Chinese leadership, recognizing that its firms in Africa were not
complying with best business practices regarding
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corruption and environmental degradation, pledged
that these firms would be encouraged to behave in an
open, fair, just, and transparent way in the future. By
2007, China had issued “good corporate citizen guidelines” to help moderate the conduct of Chinese corporations in Africa.169 That same year, the World Bank’s
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and China
EXIM Bank signed a memorandum of understanding
to work together to publicize and train Chinese banks
on the Equator Principles, a voluntary set of social and
environmental principles agreed to in 2002. There is
evidence that the Chinese MNCs are, as part of the
desire to emulate established global MNCs, in the process of embracing aspects of the corporate responsibility agenda.
Beijing’s promises to ameliorate the worst behavior of Chinese companies abroad also reflect changing attitudes within China itself, such as calls for a
“greener China.” In 2008, China EXIM Bank published
new guidelines for social and environmental impact
assessments.170 Also in 2007, China’s State Forestry
Administration and the Ministry of Commerce released guidelines that Chinese logging companies are
expected to use abroad. There were no sanctions for
not following the logging guidelines, however, and
thus, it is not surprising that there continue to be concerns about China’s purchase of timber from the African black market (as well as the illegal purchase of
African ivory), according to the May 2011 testimony
before Congress by George Washington University
Professor David Shinn.171
As Chinese business has become more deeply
embedded in Africa, however, their concerns have
shifted from attaining access to resources and market
share to sustaining their position and investments.
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This can be seen, for example, in the changing attitude
of Chinese mining sector companies in Zambia, which
have increasingly sought to bring their business practices in line with established legal requirements, such
as allowing trade union activity as a safeguard against
popular dissent.172
AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY ACTS TO
CONSTRAIN POOR CHINESE BEHAVIOR,
BUT MUZZLED CHINESE CIVIL SOCIETY
CANNOT LOBBY BEIJING FOR CHANGE
As African civil society—from labor activists and
trade analysts to environmental and human rights
lobbyists—has developed a voice on the range and
breadth of Chinese involvement in continental affairs,
civil society actors have also begun to set parameters
for Chinese action in collusion with African elites.173
China’s relations with strong, independent African
labor unions are not cordial, with labor standards in
China sometimes less stringent than in some African
countries.174
At the same time, there are important actors in the
PRC who are missing from the Africa equation: China’s civil society. If China’s autocratic leaders allowed
a free and vibrant civil society, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), religious groups, etc., might play
an important role in curbing the worst Chinese business practices in Africa. Compared to the West and
even Japan, societal interest groups figure much less
as a factor in shaping China’s aid. For example, in the
West, NGOs like Oxfam, Save the Children, and Bread
for the World lobby parliaments to add funds to the
aid budgets reflecting their particular concerns.175 In
China, private and semi-private commercial interests
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are growing factors in the determination of Chinese
assistance, particularly at the provincial levels. China
does have an emerging civil society that might also
play an influential role were it not severely constrained
by the Communist Party. However, China state interests—political, commercial, and bureaucratic—motivated largely by profit, overwhelm the humanitarian
civil society influences on aid, and even the independent indigenous blogosphere tends to oppose foreign
aid as a waste.
THE CHINESE DIASPORA: LATEST LARGE
WAVE IMPACTING AFRICA
Another issue that African governments have yet
to grapple with is the impact of Chinese immigration into Africa. Conservative estimates suggest that
there are now a million Chinese migrants across the
continent.176 With aid projects at one time or another
in every country in Africa but Swaziland and teams
of Chinese laborers imported to work on these projects, some stayed behind. This trend accelerated after
emigration rules were somewhat relaxed in China in
1985. Once Chinese workers have spent time in African countries, there is a marked tendency for some
to stay on, either working on new projects with the
Chinese firm that brought them to the continent or
branching off into their own small-business pursuits.
Thus, the development of Chinese small and medium
enterprises in Africa is also tied to the phenomenon of
growing Chinese migration to Africa, which is bringing new settler communities to parts of the continent.
The relative scale of Chinese immigration to Africa
is also significant. More Chinese have come to Africa in
the past 10 years than Europeans have in the past 400,
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The Economist claimed in April 2011. Already there are
more Chinese living in Nigeria than there were Britons during the height of the Empire, another scholar
wrote.177 Nigerian traders who had shifted their sourcing to China—and who, along with other West Africans, are much in evidence in Guangzhou, Yiwu, and
Hong Kong wholesale markets—have felt the shock of
competition as Chinese traders have moved directly
into Nigeria. Indeed, the opening of three wholesale
and retail shopping centers in major urban areas has
produced protests from Nigerian businessmen and official action that resulted in their temporary closure.178
“Across Africa, Chinatowns have sprung up, thousands of Chinese citizens have migrated, with populations now dwarfing white expatriates and traditional
Lebanese and Greek networks in many African cities.”179 In the past two presidential elections in Zambia, China’s growing influence—including the large
population of its nationals—was a key political issue.
Thousands of Chinese retail trading shops are now
strung across much of the continent, selling low-cost
and low-value products made in China directly to Africa’s rural population. The product of individual entrepreneurship, these shops are generally family owned
and staffed and rely upon a supply chain stretching
back to Hong Kong and the mainland.180 In Dar Es Salaam, the commercial capital of Tanzania, Chinese are
banned from selling in markets. The Tanzanian government announced that the Chinese were welcome
as investors but not as “vendors or shoe-shiners.”181 At
the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the
rise of Chinese retail traders and low-cost imported
goods has meant that many Africans could afford new
clothes, shoes, radios, and watches for the first time
in the lives. Often, Chinese retailers, far from being a
curse, have actually been a catalyst for development.
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PART III:
CHINA’S STRATEGIC TIES TO AFRICA:
OIL, MINERALS, AND AGRICULTURE
In this section, three strategic sectors in ChinaAfrica relations are examined: oil, minerals, and agriculture.
CHINA AND OIL DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA
China’s relentless pursuit of economic development turned the country from a petroleum exporter
to an importer by 1993—a significant milestone in its
development, and an event that also spurred China
to adopt a new foreign policy in 1995 emphasizing
greater economic ties with Africa. China is currently
the second-largest consumer of oil in the world after
the United States, with more than half of its crude oil
imported. By 2020, official sources estimate that China
will import about 65 percent of its oil, and surpass the
United States as the world’s largest net oil importer.182
(In terms of overall energy use from all sources including coal, China surpassed the United States in 2010,
according to the International Energy Agency [IEA];
in 2000, its energy consumption was half that of the
United States.)183
Barclays Capital predicted that China’s oil consumption in 2015 would be 13.6 million barrels a
day, significantly higher than an IEA estimate of 10.5
million.184 The IEA had earlier projected that China’s
demand for oil would increase to 14.2 million barrels
per day by 2025, with Chinese oil imports equaling
current imports by the United States by 2030. Whether
China’s oil imports surpass those of the United States
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in 2020 or 2030, it is clear that Africa’s importance to
China as a source of energy will only increase over
time.
The Chinese government has increasingly looked
to Africa as a way to diversify, thus reducing dependence on the less stable Middle East, which, in 2010,
still accounted for 47 percent of Chinese oil imports.185
China has developed a two-pronged strategy toward
energy investments in Africa to achieve this goal.
First, China has pursued exploration and production
deals in smaller, low-visibility countries such as Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and the DRC. Second, it has
gone after the largest oil producers, such as Angola,
by offering integrated packages of aid.186 Another key
goal of Chinese oil diplomacy in Africa is to foster the
growth of Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs) as
players in the global oil market over the long term.187
Up to now, Chinese efforts to secure oil equity in Africa have not been impressive, and Chinese oil companies are still minor players.188 The commercial value
of the oil investments in Africa by China’s NOCs is
just 8 percent of the combined commercial value of the
international oil companies’ investments in African
oil, and are often of a magnitude and quality that do
not interest Western corporations. Chinese companies
have tended to go places for oil where U.S. and European companies are not present, sometimes because
they have withdrawn for political reasons under pressure from the international community, such as Sudan, which has sent 60 percent of its oil production to
China.
Nevertheless, Western companies are concerned
about the increased presence of Chinese NOCs, and
complain that the Chinese enjoy an unfair advantage
in that their government can link oil investments to
government-to-government financial or development
74

assistance, as it did with Angola in 2004.189 In Niger,
for example, the China-Africa Development Fund
(CADF) is underwriting a 2000-km pipeline to export
oil from the landlocked country that would connect
either to Benin or Chad.190 China is also exploring
building an oil refinery in Chad.
Other countries in Africa where China has or is
investing in the oil or gas production or exploration
include Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea (about 12 percent
of its oil exports go to China), Chad, Liberia, and, most
recently, Tanzania, where the Chinese government
recently signed an agreement to lend $1.06 billion to
construct a natural gas pipeline connecting the south
of the country to Dar es Salaam.191 A Chinese company
is building Chad’s first petroleum refinery in a 60:40
joint venture.192
In 2009, China’s top three sources of oil in the
world were Saudi Arabia, Angola, and Iran, while its
top three sources of oil in Africa were Angola, Sudan,
and the DRC. Of China’s oil imports, 30 percent were
sourced from the continent, principally Angola (15.8
percent) and Sudan (6 percent). Recently, Africa’s share
of China’s oil imports increased to about one-third. By
contrast, the United States now receives 18-19 percent
of its petroleum imports from Africa. In 2009, oil and
gas accounted for 64 percent of all African exports to
China, and for 90 percent of African exports to the
United States. China’s oil imports constitute about 13
percent of total African oil exports. The United States
and Europe each purchase about one-third of Africa’s
total oil exports.193
China’s strategy of using Africa to move away
from the Middle East through diversification has not
been without risks. Libya had accounted for 3.1 percent of Chinese imports in 2009, but, with Chinese
oil imports from Libya disrupted by civil war and
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the NATO intervention in March 2011, the DRC took
third place, and now sends about 50 percent of its production to China.194 With the independence of South
Sudan in July 2011, this new country became China’s
second most important source of oil. However, when
a dispute between Sudan and South Sudan over oil
export transport fees broke out, there was a shutoff in
oil exports in November 2011. Reflecting the importance of Sudan and South Sudan for Chinese energy
imports, Beijing dispatched its special envoy for African Affairs to Khartoum and Juba in December 2011 to
propose a solution to the dispute, 195 and dispatched a
new envoy in early May 2012 in a renewed diplomatic
effort.196 On May 2, 2012, China joined other UN Security Council members in unanimously supporting
Resolution 2046, which called on Sudan and South
Sudan to halt cross-border attacks and return to negotiations.
This Sudan example also provides clear evidence
of the important oil diplomacy role that the Chinese
government can play in African countries. In June
2008 congressional testimony, the Deputy Assistant
Secretaries of State for Africa and East Asia noted,
There are often exaggerated charges that Chinese
firms’ activities or investment decisions are coordinated by the Chinese government as some sort of strategic gambit in the high-stakes game of global energy security. In reality, Chinese firms compete for profitable
projects not only with more technically and politically
savvy international firms, but also with each other.197

But this testimony missed the point that, while
the Chinese government may not have been directing
Chinese NOC decisions on which deals to pursue, it
has been a strong advocate on behalf of its national oil
companies in helping them win deals in Africa.
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The Chinese argue that their investment in upstream oil exploration and production in Africa
should not be considered threatening, but instead
welcomed, since it expands global supplies. It is important to recognize that China frequently chooses not
to ship African equity oil back to China. Logistically, it
is easier to ship West African oil to markets in Europe
and North America. Commercially, the incentive is to
choose those markets that fetch the best price. Given
its lack of success in securing oil equity in Africa, China, like the United States, will continue to rely overwhelmingly on the open market for years to come.198
At the same time, Chinese NOCs are becoming more
experienced and technologically advanced, including
facility in offshore exploration and drilling. Over time,
their competitiveness vis-à-vis Western majors will increase in Africa and elsewhere.
CHINA’S STRATEGIC TRADE IN METALS
AND MINERALS IN AFRICA—IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES
Access to oil, minerals, and other natural resources
has been cited by observers as a core interest of China
in Africa, and usually appears as number one of Beijing’s top interests in the continent. Much as China has
shown a preference for equity oil in developing oil resources in Africa and elsewhere, Beijing also prefers
equity minerals and metals. The United States also
considers access to African resources one of its core
interest in Africa, although this is arguably a lower
priority for Washington. The United States imports
relatively modest quantities of African mineral products, while China imports huge quantities of cobalt,
manganese, tantalum, copper, iron ore, and other
minerals.199
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The case has been made that there is no zero-sum
game with the United States in China’s massive purchases of African minerals and metals, but rather that
these purchases have merely pushed up commodity
prices and benefited the continent through friendly
competition. Other observers, however, are less sanguine. They note that one worrisome phenomenon
in recent years has been Chinese control of the production of more than 90 percent of rare earth minerals. Recently, Chinese companies withheld rare earth
minerals from Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and threatened to withhold them from
the United States over arms sales to Taiwan. Given
China’s hostile behavior with rare earth metals, its
behavior and intent in terms of securing global supplies of other strategic minerals are valid security issues worth examining. These metals and minerals are
important because they are used in key components
in communications devices, satellites, and electric fuel
cells.
Southern Africa contains several strategic minerals which the United States and its allies require for
industrial and military needs. The U.S. Government
is particularly concerned about access to critical defense minerals—especially, platinum group metals
(PGMs), chromium, and manganese, as well as the
rare earth minerals cobalt and uranium—which U.S.
arms manufacturers must have access to in order to
produce weapons systems. Africa holds 95 percent of
the world’s reserves of platinum group metals, and 90
percent of its chromite ore reserves.200 Concerns about
China’s possibly aggressive and sometimes monopolistic behavior in pursuit of minerals are most acute
in three Southern African countries—South Africa,
the DRC, and Zambia (with Zimbabwe also being a
“country to watch”).
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South Africa.
Chinese companies have been actively attempting
to secure a higher fraction of the world’s supply for a
number of strategic minerals, particularly manganese
ore, chromium, and ferroalloys. In recent years, China
has been investing in South Africa’s mineral sector,
aiming to secure supply of specific commodities for
which it has a shortage of reserves. There are reports of
an offtake agreement for most of South Africa’s annual
manganese ore production that has been negotiated by
the China Yunnan Metallurgical Company (CYMCO).
Over the last 6 years, China has also become involved
in South African ferrochrome mining and processing.
Chinese companies Sinosteel, Minmetals, and Jiuquan
Iron & Steel (Jisco) hold a significant share of various
South African ferrochrome producers and explorers. Sinosteel acquired 50 percent of the Tweefontein
chrome mine and the Tubatse ferrochrome smelter
for a reported $230 million in 2006, creating a joint
venture with Samancor known as Tubatse Chrome.
Sinosteel also owns 60 percent of Asa Metals, which in
turn owns 100 percent of the nearby Dilokong chrome
mine. China Minmetals subsidiary, National Minerals, has bought the exploration rights for the Naboom
chrome project in the Limpopo province from Mission
Point and Versatex for $6.5 million. Jisco is involved
in South African mining as a result of a $30 million
purchase of 26.1 percent of International Ferro Metals
(IFM), which in turn owns the Buffelsfontein chromite
mine and smelter. China Metallurgical Group also announced, in late-2011, plans to build an iron-titanium
mine in South Africa.201
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Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
and Zambia.
During the Cold War, a core interest of the DRC
(then Zaire) for the United States was its role as a secure supplier of cobalt, which is used in aeronautics.
Today, 90 percent of China’s imported cobalt comes
from the DRC (Katanga Province) and Zambia. The
2008 “Sicomines” deal between China and the DRC
was a concession to extract 10.6 million tons of copper
and 626,619 tons of cobalt, which represented a $9 billion Chinese investment. As part of the Sicomines deal,
China is building a road network stretching 4,000 kilometers (2,400 miles) and a railway system spanning
3,200 kilometers (1,920 miles). Three major Chinese
companies have a controlling interest of 68 percent
in Sicomines. The Congolese company Gecamines
has a 32 percent interest. The DRC produces a wide
range of other strategic minerals, including uranium,
coltan (columbite and tantalum), tungsten, tin, and
rare earth minerals. U.S. legislation restricts American
companies from operating in the war-torn east of the
DRC where strategic minerals for cell-phones (coltan)
and electronics are produced.202
Future Access: Mitigate Risk through Selective
Stockpiling and Encouraging Processing in
Southern Africa.
The U.S. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is responsible for maintaining the National Defense
Stockpile of strategic and critical materials, including
base metals such as cobalt and chromium and more
precious metals such as platinum, palladium, and
iridium. After the Cold War, Congress directed the
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DLA to sell the bulk of its stockpiled commodities.
With the winding down of wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and the U.S. Government’s strategic pivot back
to Asia (read: China), the Defense Department will
likely monitor more closely actions by Chinese firms
to gain equity stakes in southern African producers of
strategic minerals and metals, and may decide, over
the longer term, to bolster its stockpiles selectively.
One measure that could mitigate any move by China
to restrict the free trade in strategic minerals and metals would be to assist Pretoria in developing greater
value chains through local processing. At present,
China prefers the post-mining processes to take place
in China, though some Chinese companies have demonstrated a willingness to engage in such beneficiation overseas through the acquisition or establishment
of local production facilities.203
CHINA, AFRICA, AND AGRICULTURE: FOOD
AS THE NEXT STRATEGIC ASSET?
Guaranteeing agricultural supplies is a matter of
national security for the Chinese government. Food
makes up more than one-third of the average consumer basket. In 2007, food prices became a key concern,
even considered a risk. On several occasions, China’s
leaders have signaled their concern over the potential risk of higher prices stoking public unrest. China
became a net food importer in 2003—10 years after it
became a net importer of oil. Some observers point to
the inevitability of urbanization and the shrinkage of
arable land to make the case that China will need to
import far more food, and that some of it will increasingly be from Africa. Rising incomes and urbanization
are, indeed, leading to dramatic increases in expen-

81

ditures on food in China. China now has the second
highest expenditures on food in the world, behind the
United States; by 2015, China’s total annual food expenditures will reach over $1 trillion. It has been predicted that China’s import demand for agricultural
products will grow at double-digit rates over the next
25 years.204
Domestically, Beijing is responding by boosting
domestic sources of supply, and by attempting to
minimize the loss of agricultural land. To ensure food
security, China set a red line in 2006 to guarantee that
its arable land never shrinks to less than 1.8 billion
mu (120 million hectares).205 However, rapid urbanization and huge investments in railway, highways,
and roads in recent years required conversion of agricultural land for other purposes. The province-like
municipality of Chongqing has carried out innovative
land auctions to convert agricultural to urban land
for developers, often with a requirement to “reclaim”
nonagricultural land so as to ensure no loss in total
arable venues.
Internationally, China is enhancing trade ties to
traditional food-exporting nations. Between 2001 and
2010, China’s imports of soybeans, for example, rose
10-fold, from $2.8 billion to over $25 billion; 99 percent of China’s soybeans come from the Americas. By
contrast, China-Africa agricultural trade in 2009 was
just $4 billion, less than 4 percent of China's total agricultural trade.206
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Africa: Potential Source of Agricultural Imports
Over the Long Term.
Over the long term, Africa has tremendous potential to increase its share of global agricultural exports, most importantly because it has 60 percent of
the world’s uncultivated, arable land.207 Already, and
starting from a low base, Africa’s exports of agricultural products to China have been increasing rapidly.
Local specialties such as oranges from Egypt, wine
from South Africa, cocoa beans from Ghana, coffee
from Uganda, olive oil from Tunisia, and sesame from
Ethiopia and Senegal have become familiar to and
popular among Chinese consumers.208
China is also aligning its aid and investment in
African agriculture. China’s agricultural engagement
with Africa began in the early 1960s as an instrument
of diplomacy to counter the agricultural aid program
operated by Taiwan. Since then, more than 44 African
countries have hosted Chinese agricultural aid projects, and the Chinese have developed more than 90
farms through their aid.209 Most of these diplomatically useful but unsustainable agricultural projects
failed, however. In recent years, the Chinese government shifted toward a strategy encouraging the
takeover of these often moribund turnkey projects by
China’s nascent agribusiness corporations. Examples
of takeovers by Chinese companies include a sisal
farm privatized by the Tanzanian government, a rice
farm in Guinea, a tea plantation in Mali, and sugar
complexes in Madagascar and Togo.
In May 2006, 40 domestic and international experts
developed a roadmap for China’s strategic planners
recommending agricultural technology and seed cultivation as two areas in which China could be com-
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petitive. The experts also recommended that China
establish cutting-edge agricultural technology demonstration parks across Africa, and Beijing now plans
to establish 14 such parks. 210
Today, state-owned agribusiness enterprises carry
out many of China’s agricultural investments in Africa, some of which are aid projects executed under
contract by the Chinese government for the recipient
nation. Increasingly, however, these projects are for
profit from their inception. The Chinese government,
as part of the broader “going-out” policy initiated in
2001, provides PRC companies with a separate set of
incentives for agricultural investments.
Up to now, Chinese policy support for outward investment in agriculture, as in other sectors, is focused
on large enterprises. At the central level, the most
significant national SOE active in this sector is the
China State Farm Agribusiness Corporation (CSFAC),
which operates in several countries. CSFAC and the
Jiangsu Provincial State Farm Agribusiness Corporation (SFAC) established the China-Zambia Friendship
Farm, which devotes 667 hectares to growing barley,
maize, and soybeans. Six Chinese SOEs had established 15 farms in Zambia with a total of 10,000 hectares as of 2008. At the provincial level, there are also
examples of agricultural investments in several African countries, but none are truly large scale. Hubei
Province SFAC established a 1,000 hectare demonstration farm in 2005 in Mozambique using a grant of land
from the host government; the SFAC subsequently
formed Lianfeng Overseas Agricultural Development
Co. to expand its activities in Mozambique and other
countries in Africa. The Shaanxi SFAS established a
5,000 hectare farm with a $62.5 million investment in
Cameroon, mainly growing rice. Another project involves a Chongqing SFAC growing rice in Tanzania.211
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In May 2008, press reports claiming that China’s
Ministry of Agriculture was in the process of formulating a new policy on outward investment in agriculture attracted international concern about Chinese
“land grabs.” The Director General of the UN’s Food
and Agricultural Organization (FAO), obliquely referring to countries including China, said in August 2008
that “the race for food-importing countries to secure
farmland overseas to improve their food security risks
creating a neo-colonial system.” Likely in response to
international criticism, as well as to local opposition
as in Mozambique, China’s National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC) announced in November 2008 a 20-year food-security strategy explicitly stating that foreign land acquisitions would not be
part of China’s strategy.212 Under China’s communist
system, all land still belongs to the State, though rural
land is owned “collectively.” This ideologically driven prohibition in China of private ownership of land
suggests that Beijing would have been particularly
sensitive to foreign criticism of land grabs in Africa,
and that such criticism was likely also a factor in the
NDRC decision.
News reports indicated in January 2012 that a company from China’s Hainan Province had won Sierra
Leone’s approval for a $1.23 billion investment in rice
and rubber production on 40,000 hectares. If true, this
would be a break in the pattern of smaller-scale leases
by Chinese firms. However, given the number of articles in the past on Chinese agricultural investments
that have subsequently been proven false, such a large
figure may be inaccurate.213 For example, Chinese telecom multinational ZTE reportedly had signed a joint
venture in 2007 to produce oil palm biofuels using
3 million hectares in the DRC; the DRC government
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subsequently indicated it had approved only 100,000
hectares, and the project’s future is still uncertain.214
Conclusion: Reports of Chinese Land Grabs
in Africa Exaggerated.
Reports of Chinese land grabs in Africa are overstated. Arab states, including Libya, Egypt, Jordan,
Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi
Arabia—as well as private investors from throughout
the developing and developed world—have indeed
made recent land acquisitions in Africa. By contrast,
Beijing, alarmed by local criticism, has remained cautious about large land purchases by Chinese companies. Some Chinese businessmen do see Africa as
a target for grain-production exports to the Chinese
market, and as a source of biofuels. Chinese firms
sought deals for biofuel palm oil in the DRC in 2007
and biofuel jatropha in Zambia in 2009.215 Yet, the
Chinese appear to be investing primarily via cooperative projects rather than exclusive land deals.216 So far,
Chinese investment in African farming, forestry, fishing, and animal husbandry has accounted for only 3.1
percent of its FDI.
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PART IV:
U.S. RESPONSES TO CHINA IN AFRICA
POTENTIAL FOR U.S.-CHINA COOPERATION
IN AFRICA: LIMITED AND CONSTRAINED
BY BEIJING
China’s foreign policy toward Africa all too often
legitimizes human rights abuses and undemocratic
practices under the guise of noninterference in the
internal affairs of other countries.217 At a U.S. Senate hearing on China in Africa on November 1, 2011,
lawmakers criticized China’s state-backed support for
governments with poor human rights records, stating
that “China is interested in [its] own goals and has
very little concern about the governance of the countries that they deal with.”
In fact, Beijing selectively welcomes good governance—when it protects the trade and investment
interests of Chinese businesses, e.g., in an advanced
economy like South Africa. In general, however, China undermines Western goals of promoting democracy, good governance, and human rights in Africa by:
1) enabling certain governments, such as Zimbabwe
and Ethiopia, to restrict the flow of information on the
Internet;218 2) granting aid and trade credits without
conditionality related to good governance; and, 3) ignoring when its rent-seeking businessmen use bribery
and gifts to win contracts and government approvals.
While Beijing’s “no-strings attached” approach to
aid appeals to some African elites, it also poses a direct
challenge to the good governance focus of the Washington Consensus.219 The Washington Consensus in-
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volved the imposition of conditionalities by the World
Bank, IMF, and donors regarding macroeconomic
policy, public spending, and transparency as well as,
in some cases, the holding of democratic elections by
African governments. Chinese involvement in Africa
has sparked talk in the West of an emerging Beijing
Consensus predicated on noninterference in domestic affairs of states. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles
Zanawi, speaking at the January 2012 inauguration of
the new AU headquarters paid for by China, claimed
that the recent rapid growth experienced by many African countries had coincided with a trend toward the
adoption of China’s state-led economic model. The
Prime Minister excoriated The Economist—a standardbearer magazine of the Washington Consensus—for
having published a banner headline a decade ago that
Africa was “The Hopeless Continent,” only to recently
publish a new banner headline that simply read “Africa Rising.”220 Sidestepping a journalist’s question
about whether Africans should follow the Washington
or the Beijing Consensus, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
said at the 2009 FOCAC that “Africa’s development
should be based on its own conditions and should follow its own path, that is, the African model.”221
In this context of an authoritarian, nationalistic,
and mercantilist China, what real potential is there for
cooperation with the United States in Africa? From a
pragmatic perspective, there should be some grounds
for cooperation. After all, both China and the United
States have similar interests in gaining access to Africa’s vast energy and raw material resources, and
both require a stable geopolitical environment on the
continent in order for them to achieve their objectives.
For example, China’s willingness in May 2012 to work
with the United States in the UN Security Council to
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pass Resolution 2046 on Sudan and South Sudan primarily reflects its desire to see oil exports from the Sudans resumed as soon as possible.
The rhetoric of official U.S. policy has been that
there has not been a zero-sum competition with China
for influence in Africa. In this view, there is no inherent
strategic conflict between China and the United States
in Africa: Sino-American cooperation in Africa is not
only possible, but it is in the interests of all stakeholders who seek to promote Africa’s development and
integration into the global economy.222
In theory, China and the United States could potentially work together to build the export capacity of
African industries; provide technical assistance on climate change; and collaborate on peacekeeping operations, anti-piracy operations, countering drug smuggling, and disaster relief.223 U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, following a
November 2011 trip to China, said that, “We are eager
to see if we can work with China to leverage our comparative advantages to help Africa overcome some of
it economic challenges, particularly in the area of agriculture, health, and clean water.”224
Moreover, there have already been precedents
for U.S.-China cooperation within several African
countries. In Liberia, for example, the U.S. Government trained staff and refurbished the Ministry of
Defense headquarters. China provided vehicles and
computer equipment, and is providing some specialty
training and rebuilding at least one base up-country.
Good communication between the U.S. and Chinese
embassies on the ground in Liberia has helped each
party identify areas for inputs.225 This occurred, for
example, where China and the United States agreed
to join forces to combat malaria, and collaborated in
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the construction of the military barracks at Bonga for a
UN peacekeeping operation.226 In agriculture, the U.S.
and Chinese Ambassadors in Ethiopia arranged exchanges to observe demonstration farms each country
has built to increase agricultural capacity. In Gabon, a
U.S. official said recently, the United States hopes to
work with China and Gabonese public health experts
on preventing the emergence of infectious diseases.227
The reality, however, is that Beijing is not really interested in broad-based strategic cooperation with the
United States in Africa, so we will continue to have
only occasional showcase examples of cooperation
instead of true, sustained, and strategic cooperation.
One reason is Beijing’s fear that coordinated U.S.China diplomatic engagement could raise suspicions
among some African parties that the United States
and China are ganging up against them. The major
reason, however, is domestic PRC politics, which are
marked by hyper-mistrust of the United States. This
mistrust reflects a strong nationalism and the Communist Party’s strict control of the news media, which can
create a nationalistic echo chamber of anti-American
propaganda that makes it hard for positive images of
the United States to be seen, and even harder for advocates of greater cooperation with the United States
to speak up.
Another Chinese sensitivity, particularly for the
China’s Communist Party, is how any potential cooperation is framed. If contributions from the Chinese
side for a joint cooperative project appear to be equal
or even superior to those of the American side, then it
might be accepted by the Chinese side. However, even
a humanitarian project in which the American side’s
contribution (e.g., visit of a hospital ship) appears
to be more impressive than that of the Chinese side
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(e.g., medical teams supporting a strengthened health
care system), it would likely be rejected for reasons of
“face” and the need for Chinese propaganda to weed
out unfavorable comparisons with foreign partners. In
this regard, joint U.S.-China cooperation in the fight
against malaria might be promising. The Chinese are
particularly proud of the anti-malarial drug Artemsinin, which was based on traditional Chinese medicine, so they might be willing to cooperate in this very
narrow area.
The United States is trying to use bilateral diplomacy to shift China’s policies in Africa. U.S. Under
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Robert D. Hormats said at a recent meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue that the United States
supported Chinese investment and aid to African
economies but that, consistent with global norms, Beijing should adopt more transparent financing to combat corruption, and impose stricter environmental and
labor standards. China can play a constructive role in
Africa as an investor, but needs to be a responsible
investor, Hormats said. In a sense, this is an Africaspecific corollary of the U.S. theme, first championed
by then Deputy Secretary of State (and former World
Bank President) Robert Zoellick, that a rising China
should become a responsible stakeholder on the global scene.228
Unfortunately, U.S. Government efforts are unlikely to influence China’s policies in Africa. In the
trade sphere, China uses East Asian mercantilist policies, including currency manipulation and domestic
innovation rules discriminating against foreign firms
to circumvent its WTO commitments. In general, Beijing’s authoritarian government thinks only of China’s interests and will resist international pressure. In
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November 1, 2011, testimony before the U.S. Senate,
American University professor Deborah Brautigam
made a suggestion on how to encourage China to become a more responsible stakeholder in Africa:
The OECD sets the standard for being a responsible
global player. . . . The Chinese by and large are familiar with these rules. We need to think about ways
in which we can make actually joining the club—as
South Korea and Mexico have recently done—both
feasible and attractive to the Chinese.

The problem with this suggestion is multifold.
First, China is unlikely to agree to have its companies
constrained by OECD rules without spending a few
more years learning how to “go global,” much as it insisted on long phase-in periods for many sectors prior
to its WTO accession. When China no longer sees itself as a developing country but rather as an emerging middle-income country, only then will it seriously
consider joining the OECD. However, it is not certain
China would ever wish to join the OECD, as this could
undermine its leadership among non-aligned countries of the south, nor is it certain that other OECD
members would accept China as a member of this
democrats’ club. Worse still, even if China did join
the OECD, it would likely pay only lip service to its
commitments on aid, trade credits, and anti-bribery.
Specifically, China would do the utmost to nullify its
commitments by skirting or ignoring the rules, much
as it does at present in the WTO.
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CONCLUSION:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
U.S. POLICYMAKERS
What, then, should U.S. policymakers do in the
face of China’s rapid rise and advance in Africa, and
its minimal interest in collaborating with the United
States on the African continent? Here are four recommendations:
1. Face up To China’s Commercial Challenge in
Africa by Strengthening U.S. Economic Diplomacy.
One central argument of this monograph is that national strength and security ultimately depend on a strong
economic foundation. In this regard, the United States
needs to work proactively to improve its competitive
position in Africa vis-à-vis China and other emerging
nations. It could do this in a number of ways:
•	Biannual Presidential Summits with African
Heads of State: Organize a U.S. Presidential
summit with African heads of state in Washington in the summer of 2014, and do so biannually again in 2016 and beyond. Historically,
AGOA Forums have rotated annually between
Washington and an African capital. The next
U.S. President, whether a re-elected President
Obama or a new Republican President, could
travel to the next AGOA Forum in Africa in the
summer of 2013 as a part of a multi-country
tour of African nations. This could then set the
stage for the first-ever U.S. Presidential summit
with African heads of state in Washington in
the summer of 2014. Strong economic diplomacy begins with building personal relationships,
and starting at the top also sends a message to
the U.S. Government, Congress, and the Amer-
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ican people that Africa is an important market
that we, as a nation, will not ignore. Members
of the U.S. cabinet, such as the Treasury and
Energy Secretary, should also travel more frequently to Africa to the extent that their portfolios allow them to promote U.S. goods and
services.
•	Boost U.S. Export Promotion in Africa: President Obama’s National Export Initiative announced March 11, 2010, and Secretary Clinton’s October 14, 2011, speech on economic
statecraft were excellent statements of intent,
but need to be converted into sustained, multiyear action with real resources behind them.
The President sought a 5 percent increase in
the fiscal year 2013 budget for the U.S. Department of Commerce—a powerful statement that
his administration intends to promote U.S.
exports, despite a severely constrained budgetary environment. The Administration and
Congress should work in a bipartisan fashion
to ensure increased funding for promotion of
U.S. exports to Africa, including:
— (Re)opening USFCS offices in Africa;
— Increased funding for USTDA, USEXIM
Bank, and even OPIC activities in Africa (because U.S. investment abroad often leads to
U.S. exports as well); and,
— Expanded, mandatory commercial training
for U.S. State Department Foreign Service
Officers (FSOs) serving at U.S. Embassies in
Africa with no USFCS presence.
The Administration and Congress should also consider shifting USFCS back into the State Department
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and, at a minimum, modifying the promotion criteria
for State Department FSOs to make successful U.S. export encouragement and enhancement a key factor in
selection of Chiefs of Mission and in FSO promotions.
2. Match China’s New Soft Power in Africa by
Funding U.S. Soft Power. As noted above, another
reason for China’s newly found success in Africa is its
expanded development and use of soft power. Several
elements of its soft power diplomacy are lifted from
the U.S. diplomatic playbook, including training and
scholarships; cultural and language centers; promoting news services; developing a volunteer corps; and
an international visitor program. The United States
should continue to fund its successful soft power efforts adequately in Africa, including public diplomacy, the Fulbright program, and the Peace Corps. At a
time when China has opened many Confucius Centers in Africa, the United States should be opening,
not closing, more American Cultural Centers.
3. Review U.S. Policy on Strategic Metals Stockpiling: Seek China’s Peaceful Rise, But Prepare for
the Worst. In raising strategic metals as an issue, I do
not intend to suggest that the United States and China
are heading toward an armed conflict at any point in
the 21st century or beyond. A central and unwaveringly correct tenet of U.S. foreign policy toward China
is to welcome its peaceful rise. At the same time, prudence calls us to revisit U.S. policy on the stockpiling
of certain strategic metals. As noted above, Chinese
companies—upon instructions from the Chinese government—withheld rare earth minerals from Japan
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and threatened to withhold them from the United States over
arms sales to Taiwan. Given that China has already
engaged in hostile behavior with rare earth metals, the
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United States has every right to be wary of China’s
intentions, and should monitor more closely actions
by Chinese firms to gain equity stakes in southern African producers of strategic minerals and metals. If appropriate, the United States should selectively bolster
its strategic stockpiles.
Chinese culture is rich in sayings, including those
from Sun Tzu’s Art of War. At the same time, the West
has a few of its own. One of these is the Latin adage “si
vis pacem, para bellum,” or “if you wish peace, prepare
for war.”
4. Never Give Up Hope: Is Maritime Security in
the Gulf of Guinea One Area of Possible U.S.-China
Cooperation? I argued above that the scope for U.S.China cooperation in Africa is narrow, mainly because
of the hyper-mistrust of the U.S. Government by Beijing’s Communist Party. This is not to suggest that
U.S. policymakers should give up in seeking ways to
cooperate with China to the extent that U.S. national
interests are served as well. As a Chinese proverb puts
it, “Seek common ground while putting aside differences.” Given Beijing’s wariness about cooperation,
one pragmatic way to do this in Africa is to take our
cue from areas in which Beijing has stated that international action is needed.
One example of an area in which such bilateral
cooperation in Africa may be possible is in helping
countries in West and Central Africa to better control
their maritime domain. In this regard, Chinese Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Wang Min called on the international community on
October 19, 2011, to provide assistance actively in
combating piracy in the Gulf of Guinea:
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The coastal countries [of West and Central Africa]
and the international community need to attach great
importance to the root cause of piracy in the Gulf
of Guinea, adopt comprehensive strategies, [and]
strengthen security capacity building.229

As the section above on oil diplomacy suggests,
there is a commonality of interests for the United
States and China in ensuring safe shipping routes and
uninterrupted oil production in the Gulf of Guinea,
whose offshore oil reserves are already the largest in
the world. The problem of illicit activities in the maritime domain of littoral states of the Gulf of Guinea is
serious and worsening, fundamentally threatening
the region’s stability and development. Besides piracy, these illicit activities include trafficking in drugs,
arms, and people; illegal fishing; and dumping of
waste.
China has already shown its willingness to contribute to the fight against piracy in East Africa. Therefore,
an important precedent for international cooperation
has already been established within China’s foreign
policy and military communities for anti-piracy cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. Wang made his comments on the same day as an open debate in the UN
Security Council on the topic of “Peace and Security
in Africa: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,” convened by
Nigeria in its capacity as rotating monthly President
of the Security Council. Nigeria convened this debate
at the request of Benin and other countries in the region. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, in a January
18 letter to the Security Council, recalled the October
Security Council debate, noted how China had agreed
to fund the purchase of a ship for Benin, and called on
all international partners to:
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provide logistical support to ECOWAS and ECCAS to
improve their capabilities to counter piracy . . . in particular with regard to infrastructure, radar, communications equipment and training of maritime security
personnel.230

Therefore, there is existing strong African and UN
support for collective international action to counter
piracy (and other illicit activities) in the Gulf of Guinea. Under the cover of the UN Secretary General’s call
for action, and at the urging of several countries in
West and Central Africa, including Nigeria and Benin, China may be willing to explore with the United
States how the two could collaborate with other nations to fight piracy and other illicit activities in the
Gulf of Guinea.
Given the radically different nature of illicit activities in the Gulf of Guinea, the focus of coordination
and burden sharing by the United States and China
could be on training and equipping West and Central
African navies and coast guards—not on patrols by
the international community itself. West and Central
Africa, unlike East Africa, do not face the problem of a
failed state with a long coastline—Somalia. They have
not ceded their sovereignty and would not welcome
prolonged patrols by the international community in
their territorial waters or Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs). The United States, for its part, may also be
very leery of seeing Chinese naval vessels entering the
south Atlantic, even if they would be a great distance
from the U.S. homeland. To address our own concerns, we could continue the positive work with African navies via the Africa Partnership Station (APS)
and the African Maritime Law Enforcement Program
(AMLEP) programs—which include the use of U.S.
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naval and coast guard vessels—while encouraging
China to focus on equipping African naval and coast
guards toward a primarily law-enforcement mission
in the Gulf of Guinea, not on patrolling or training
aboard Chinese vessels.
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